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Kristin E. Hickman† & Mark Thomson‡
In 2012, the Government Accountability Office surprised
many administrative law specialists by reporting that fully
35% of major rules and 44% of nonmajor rules issued by fed-
eral government agencies lacked prepromulgation notice and
opportunity for public comment.  For at least most of the major
rules, however, the issuing agencies accepted comments from
the public after issuing the rule, and in most of those cases the
agencies followed up with new final rules, responding to com-
ments and often making changes in response thereto.  Agency
rules that invert the procedural steps of notice-and-comment
rulemaking in this way do not precisely comply with the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, yet are arguably close enough that
some courts have felt compelled to uphold them.  Challenges to
rules adopted in this manner have created a jurisprudential
mess, as courts struggle to balance their duty to enforce the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act with the
practical realities of the modern administrative state.  The
sheer extent of the practice demonstrates the need for a more
consistent judicial response.  This Article explores the different
approaches courts have taken to judicial review of postpromul-
gation notice and comment.  The Article concludes that the all-
or-nothing models embraced by some courts are doctrinally
and practically untenable, but that the middle-ground alterna-
tives employed by other courts thus far do not ensure that
postpromulgation notice and comment function as an
equivalent substitute for prepromulgation procedures.  Fortu-
nately, the existing jurisprudential muddle is not so rigidly
fixed as to require Congress, or even necessarily the Supreme
Court, to resolve it.  The Article proposes a solution to the
middle-ground problem, first by reviewing the doctrinal theory
surrounding agency rulemaking and then by articulating a set
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of factors for courts to employ in evaluating postpromulgation
notice and comment case by case.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2012, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) published a study documenting that federal agencies
failed to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking and offer the
public the opportunity to comment before issuing fully 35% of
the 568 major rules—regulations with an annual economic im-
pact of $100 million or more—and 44% of the 30,000 nonmajor
rules adopted from 2003 through 2010.1  This practice was
spread across a variety of agencies.  The GAO singled out the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Commodity
Credit Corporation, and the Farm Service Agency as the largest
offenders with respect to major rules; for nonmajor rules, the
GAO specially mentioned Departments of Transportation,
1 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13–21, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGEN-
CIES COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO RESPOND TO PUBLIC COMMENTS 3 n.6, 8 (2012),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651052.pdf [http://perma.cc/R9QA-MM56].
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Commerce, and Homeland Security, along with the Environ-
mental Protection Agency.2
For many of those rules, the agency did not stop with the
initial published rule but pursued additional postpromulgation
procedures.  For example, the GAO reported that for 77 of the
123 major rules issued without a notice of proposed rulemak-
ing, the agencies requested comments from the public after
promulgating the regulation.3  In 51 of those 77 instances, the
agency followed up with new final rules, responding to com-
ments and often making changes in response thereto.4
This sort of “interim-final rulemaking” with only post-
promulgation notice and comment is not new.5  Legal scholars
and the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
have long recognized that agencies use interim-final rulemak-
ing and also that the practice, in many instances, is questiona-
ble as a matter of law.6  But the scope of the GAO’s findings
reflects a reality of contemporary administrative practice that is
both widespread and, in many instances, fundamentally at
odds with the expectations of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)7 as interpreted by the federal judiciary.  That reality puts
the judiciary in an awkward position.
Ordinarily, § 553 of the APA requires an agency to do three
things before a new substantive rule takes effect.  First, the
agency must give the public “notice” of the proposed rule, in-
cluding “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved.”8  Next the
agency must “give interested persons an opportunity to partici-
pate in the rule making” by allowing them to submit comments
2 Id. at 11 & n.26, 12.
3 Id. at 24–25.
4 Id. at 26.
5 The administrative law literature commonly refers to regulations adopted
with postpromulgation notice and comment as “interim-final rules.” See, e.g.,
Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 703
(1999).  The GAO reported that “agencies used 109 distinct terms” for such proce-
dures, including but not limited to “final rules, interim rules, temporary rules,
direct final rules, and notices,” but noted also that “[i]n practice, however, there
may be little distinction between interim rules and certain other rules without [a
notice of proposed rulemaking] that were described using different terminology.”
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 14. R
6 See Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,110–13 (Aug.
18, 1995) (acknowledging interim-final rulemaking as well as the slightly different
“direct final rulemaking” by many agencies); Asimow, supra note 5, at 717–18, R
725–26 (observing that, absent a legal exception from APA notice and comment
requirements, “a rule adopted with post- rather than pre-adoption notice and
comment is procedurally invalid”).
7 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012).
8 Id. § 553(b)(3).
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on the proposed rule.9  After an agency takes these steps and
reviews the comments it receives, the APA contemplates that
the agency will finalize the proposed rule by publishing it in the
Federal Register along with an explanatory preamble or “con-
cise general statement of [the rule’s] basis and purpose.”10  Al-
though the preamble need not respond to every comment the
agency receives, it must address all “significant comments that
cast doubt on the reasonableness of the rule the agency
adopts.”11  The APA generally requires publication of a final
rule at least thirty days before the rule takes effect.12
Congress recognized in crafting § 553 that requiring notice
and opportunity for public comment before a rule takes effect is
not always helpful or worthwhile, and may even be problematic
in some instances.13  Thus, the APA includes a handful of ex-
ceptions to § 553’s public notice and comment requirements.
For example, under the “good cause” exception, an agency may
forgo the requirements of informal rulemaking when notice and
comment would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest.”14  Similarly, the “interpretative rule” ex-
ception allows agencies to skip notice and comment when the
rule to be promulgated merely clarifies or explains an existing
statute or rule.15  Other exceptions apply to rules concerning
military or foreign affairs, agency management, agency proce-
dure, or statements of policy.16
The GAO documented agencies’ reliance on all of these
exceptions, though especially the good cause exception, when
agencies issue rules without prepromulgation notice and com-
ment.17  No doubt such reliance is often justified, and the GAO
9 Id. § 553(c).
10 Id.
11 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 817 F.2d 108, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
see also Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 441–42
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (discussing that an agency’s obligation to respond to “significant
comments raised during rulemaking” is flexible).
12 5 U.S.C. § 553(d).
13 See Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment
Rulemaking Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J.
317, 319–20 n.3 (1989) (discussing that Congress provided exemptions from the
notice and comment requirements to ensure agency flexibility).
14 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B).
15 Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d
658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
16 5 U.S.C. § 553(a), (b)(A)–(B).
17 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 15–21.  Agencies R
claimed good cause in 77% of major rules and 61% of nonmajor rules issued
without prepromulgation notice and comment, but the GAO documented in-
stances in which agencies had asserted each of the other exceptions listed in APA
§ 553. Id.
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did not suggest otherwise.  ACUS recommends that agencies
consider postpromulgation procedures even when relying on
one of the APA’s exceptions.18  Agencies following that recom-
mendation go beyond the APA’s requirements and exemplify
conscientious governance.
Nevertheless, the scope of the exceptions from APA notice
and comment procedures has never been clear,19 making them
difficult for both agencies and courts to apply.  Courts have
repeatedly admonished “that exceptions to the notice and com-
ment requirements will be narrowly construed and only reluc-
tantly countenanced,” lest the exceptions “carve the heart out
of the statute.”20  Partly for this reason, courts frequently reject
agency claims regarding the applicability of the APA excep-
tions.21  The APA does not define when a rule is interpretative
as opposed to legislative, or what it means for a rule to be
“impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public inter-
est.”  While the Attorney General22 and the courts23 have at-
18 Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,112–13 (Aug. 18,
1995).
19 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
893, 929 (2004) (discussing the arbitrary nature of the “interpretive rules” and
“general statements of policy” exceptions to the notice and comment
requirements).
20 Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 713 F.2d 795, 800
(D.C. Cir. 1983); see, e.g., Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. EPA, 652 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (holding that a subsequent statute did not demonstrate sufficient congres-
sional intent to supersede notice and comment requirements); Tunik v. Merit Sys.
Prot. Bd., 407 F.3d 1326, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that a regulation was
not exempt from the notice and comment requirements due to narrow construal of
exceptions); Flagstaff Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Sullivan, 962 F.2d 879, 885–86 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that enforcement of a regulation fell within agency discretion and
was therefore within the narrow exceptions to the notice and comment require-
ments); Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 758 F.2d 1052, 1058 (5th Cir. 1985)
(holding that the repeal of a regulation fell within an exemption from notice and
comment requirements despite narrow interpretation of the exemption).
21 See, e.g., Sorenson Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 755 F.3d 702, 706–07 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (rejecting agency’s good cause claim as unsupported by the administrative
record); Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1023–24 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (rejecting
Department of Labor claim that two Training and Employment Guidance Letters
were exempt interpretative rules or procedural rules); Time Warner Cable Inc. v.
FCC, 729 F.3d 137, 168–71 (2d Cir. 2013) (rejecting procedural rule exception
claim and invalidating agency rule for procedural flaws).
22 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 30–31 (1947).
23 See, e.g., Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 251–53 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (attempting to explain distinctions among legislative rules, interpretative
rules, and general statements of policy); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87,
93–95 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing at length circumstances constituting good
cause); Public Citizen v. Dep’t of State, 276 F.3d 634, 640 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(describing a shift in standards for evaluating the procedural rule exception); Am.
Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 109–11 (D.C. Cir.
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tempted to supply content to those terms, the definitions
offered are hardly models of clarity or precision.24  Thus, agen-
cies are often left to guess whether a court will uphold claims
that an exception from prepromulgation notice and comment
applies.  Meanwhile, agencies face strong incentives to avoid, or
at least postpone, notice and comment proceedings.25  Most
obviously, agencies can get their rules implemented more
quickly and economically by foregoing prepromulgation notice
and comment, even if they subsequently accept public com-
ments and adjust their rules in response.  It stands to reason,
therefore, that at least a significant percentage of agency regu-
lations lacking prepromulgation notice and comment are not,
in fact, exempt from those procedures under the APA.26
Agencies’ substantial avoidance of prepromulgation notice
and comment, and their associated reliance on the murky
§ 553 exceptions and use of postpromulgation procedures,
pose obvious difficulties for the courts.  Again, the APA contem-
plates that some agency rules will be exempt from notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures, and agency use of post-
promulgation procedures in such instances is recommended
and desirable.  If an agency promulgates a rule claiming an
exception from § 553’s prepromulgation notice and comment
requirements and a court subsequently holds that the claimed
exception does not apply, then the rule is simply invalid.27  But
what if—as ACUS has urged and the GAO says often occurs—
the agency provided the public with notice and the opportunity
1993) (identifying factors for distinguishing between legislative rules and interpre-
tative ones).
24 See David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Per-
ils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 278–79 (2010); Lavilla, supra note 13, at R
321–22; Manning, supra note 19, at 894. R
25 Manning, supra note 19, at 894 (“If an agency could make binding policy R
through a rulemaking process that does not entail notice and comment, it would
have little incentive to use that more cumbersome process.”); Thomas O. Mc-
Garity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J.
1385, 1385–86 (1992) (“[A]gencies are beginning to seek out alternative, less
participatory regulatory vehicles to circumvent the increasingly stiff and formal-
ized structures of the informal rulemaking process.”).
26 Cf. Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1748–59 (2007) (documenting the Treasury Depart-
ment’s routine overreliance on APA exceptions from notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures).
27 See, e.g., 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 18.1 (5th
ed. 2010) (“In most cases, successful prosecution of a review proceeding yields
instead a judicial decision setting aside the agency action and remanding the
proceeding for further agency action not inconsistent with the decision of the
reviewing court.”); id. § 18.4 (recognizing role of declaratory and injunctive relief in
the course of nonstatutory review).
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to comment after issuing the rule, and then issued a final rule
responding to the input received?  How should courts assess
the procedural validity of a final rule derived from a procedur-
ally flawed interim-final rule?  Do postpromulgation notice and
comment cure the underlying procedural infirmity?  Or does
the procedural defect that taints the original, interim-final rule
carry over to the succeeding final rule?
The APA’s text might support the notion that postpromul-
gation procedures can substitute, at least sometimes, for
prepromulgation notice and comment.  Section 706 of the APA
directs that courts reviewing agency action take “due ac-
count . . . of the rule of prejudicial error.”28  The Supreme Court
has clarified that the prejudicial error language in § 706 simply
“requires [courts] to apply the same kind of ‘harmless-error’
rule [in administrative cases] that courts ordinarily apply in
civil cases.”29  According to several courts, that means “a mis-
take that has no bearing on the [agency’s] ultimate decision or
causes no prejudice shall not be the basis for reversing an
agency’s determination.”30  To the extent postpromulgation no-
tice and comment ensure meaningful public input in the
agency’s ultimate decision, then, they might be taken to render
the lack of prepromulgation notice and comment harmless
under § 706.
Yet, if courts endorse that approach—by holding that post-
promulgation notice and comment remedy the procedural inva-
lidity of an interim-final rule promulgated under an
inapplicable exception from § 553—would they effectively un-
dermine the APA’s command that agencies pursue prepromul-
gation notice and comment? Several courts have suggested as
much.31
28 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
29 Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 406 (2009).
30 Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 637 (6th Cir. 1997); see also, e.g., Save
Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA, 269 F.3d 49, 61 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding that a “harmless
error” of procedure does not merit the remand of an agency’s “reasoned finding”);
Steel Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 27 F.3d 642, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that the EPA’s
failure to allow comment was a harmless error because the agency had “adequate
and independent grounds” for setting the standard in question, and the error thus
was not fatal to the final rule).
31 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 444 (5th
Cir. 2001) (“Agency mistakes constitute harmless error only where they ‘clearly
had no bearing on the procedure used or the substance of decision reached.’”
(quoting U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 215 (5th Cir. 1979)); Riverbend
Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th Cir. 1992) (“To avoid gutting the
APA’s procedural requirements, harmless error analysis in administrative
rulemaking must therefore focus on the process as well as the result.”).
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Not surprisingly, courts have struggled to resolve these
questions or find a middle ground between upholding or invali-
dating all such regulations.  This Article explores the judicial
response to agency reliance on postpromulgation notice and
comment procedures as a substitute for the more traditional
prepromulgation rulemaking procedures.  The existing juris-
prudence contemplating postpromulgation notice and com-
ment procedures is a mess, but is not so rigidly fixed as to
require Congress, or even necessarily the Supreme Court, to
resolve it.
To provide context for the discussion, Part I of the Article
examines three sets of cases in which the courts struggled to
decide whether postpromulgation notice and comment may
serve as a substitute for the prepromulgation procedures de-
scribed in § 553 of the APA.  Part II breaks down the alternative
approaches the courts have taken and considers the justifica-
tions for and difficulties presented by each.  In particular, Part
II concludes that the all-or-nothing approaches embraced by
some courts are doctrinally and practically untenable, but that
the middle-ground alternatives employed by other courts do
not ensure that postpromulgation notice and comment func-
tion as an equivalent for prepromulgation procedures.  Part III
proposes a solution to the middle-ground problem, first by re-
viewing the doctrinal theory surrounding agency rulemaking
and then by articulating a set of factors for courts to employ in
evaluating postpromulgation notice and comment case by case.
I
THREE CASE STUDIES
The judicial reaction to interim-final rules with post-
promulgation notice and comment has been mixed, reflecting
the difficulties encountered by the courts in balancing their
obligation to enforce the APA’s legal requirements with the
practical realities of the modern regulatory state.  Perhaps be-
cause good cause claims in particular tend to be highly contex-
tual, the courts at times seem inconsistent in their assessment
of postpromulgation notice and comment, making it difficult to
sort the jurisprudence into an obvious and straightforward cir-
cuit split.  Three lines of decisions—each dealing with a differ-
ent set of interim-final rules that spawned multiple, nearly
simultaneous circuit court cases—illustrate both the chal-
lenges these cases present and the courts’ various attempts to
find an appropriate response.
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A. The EPA’s Nonattainment Area Regulations
Enacted in 196332 and amended many times since, the
Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to list all air pollutants that, in the Administrator’s judg-
ment, pose a threat to the public health and welfare, and also
to establish ambient air quality standards for each such pollu-
tant defining the levels of air quality necessary to protect the
public health and welfare from the pollutants’ adverse effects.33
Once ambient air quality standards are established, the Act
requires each state to develop a detailed implementation plan
to ensure the air quality within the state meets those stan-
dards.34  Areas within many states failed to achieve compliance
with the standards by statutory deadlines,35 so in 1977 Con-
gress amended the Act to establish new deadlines and to detail
a state and local planning process employing strict federal re-
view to make certain that the new deadlines would be met.  The
amended Act directed the states to submit to the EPA by De-
cember 5, 1977, a list of nonattainment areas for all pollutants
for which the agency had set primary standards.36  Within sixty
days thereafter, by February 3, 1978, the EPA was to promul-
gate these lists with any modifications it deemed necessary.37
The Act then required states to develop implementation plans
by January 1, 1979.38
A number of state agencies submitted initial lists of nonat-
tainment areas that classified certain counties as “unclassifi-
able” for certain pollutants.  On March 3, 1978—already one
month after the statutory deadline, but without the notice or
opportunity for prior comment required by the APA—the EPA
published a final list of state nonattainment areas that
changed from “unclassifiable” to “nonattainment” many of the
classifications submitted by state agencies.39  To justify its de-
cision to forego prepromulgation notice and comment regard-
ing its final classifications, the EPA asserted the APA’s good
cause exception, maintaining that the statutory deadlines im-
32 Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
33 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671.
34 Id.
35 See, e.g., City of Waco v. EPA, 620 F.2d 84, 85 (5th Cir. 1980) (mentioning
the failure of states to “achieve compliance with the primary standards [of the
Clean Air Act] by the statutory deadlines”).
36 See 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1).
37 See id. § 7407(d)(2).
38 See id. § 7407(d)(3).
39 See Attainment Status Designations, 43 Fed. Reg. 8,962 (Mar. 3, 1978).
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posed by the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments made
prepromulgation notice and comment “impracticable” and
“contrary to the public interest.”40  As a substitute for the lack
of prepromulgation notice and comment, however, the EPA
provided a sixty-day postpromulgation period for interested
parties to submit comments.41  Six months later, on September
11, 1978, after considering the comments submitted, the EPA
reaffirmed many—but not all—of its nonattainment
classifications.42
Affected states, cities, and businesses sued, alleging,
among other things, that the EPA had violated § 553 by failing
to engage in prepromulgation notice and comment.  Two cir-
cuits credited the EPA’s good cause claim, obviating the need to
consider the effect of the EPA’s reliance on postpromulgation
notice and comment as a substitute for prepromulgation proce-
dures.43  Other circuits, however, rejected the EPA’s claim of
good cause.44  These courts thus had to grapple with what
effect to give the EPA’s use of postpromulgation notice and
comment.
Some circuits declined to give any effect whatsoever to the
EPA’s use of postpromulgation notice and comment proce-
dures, reasoning that such procedures were not an effective
substitute for prepromulgation notice and comment, and that
giving effect to such procedures would gut the APA’s
prepromulgation notice and comment requirements.  As the
Third Circuit explained in one case:
If a period for comments after issuance of a rule could cure a
violation of the APA’s requirements, an agency could negate
at will the Congressional decision that notice and an oppor-
tunity for comment must precede promulgation.  Provision of
prior notice and comment allows effective participation in the
rulemaking process while the decisionmaker is still receptive
to information and argument.  After the final rule is issued,
the petitioner must come hat-in-hand and run the risk that
the decisionmaker is likely to resist change.45
The Third Circuit also rejected the EPA’s argument that its
error had been harmless, offering two reasons why, notwith-
40 Id. at 8,962.
41 Id.
42 See Attainment Status Designations, 43 Fed. Reg. 40,412 (Sept. 11, 1978).
43 Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797, 803–04 (6th Cir. 1980); U.S.
Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283, 286–89 (7th Cir. 1979).
44 See, e.g., State of N.J., Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1040
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the EPA’s good cause claim was invalid).
45 Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1979).
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standing that the procedurally invalid designations could be
amended or replaced by procedurally valid designations, the
invalid designations were nevertheless harmful.46  First, the
court said, so long as they were in effect, the procedurally
invalid designations would undeniably shape regulated parties’
behavior.47  Second, the court explained that the procedurally
invalid designations were not harmless because they “evidently
[would] have some weight [on subsequent designations], even if
they [would] not be dispositive.”48  This observation at least
suggested that postpromulgation notice and comment could
not compensate for a lack of prepromulgation notice and com-
ment because of the risk that procedurally invalid initial desig-
nations would taint or influence subsequent designations.
Having found the EPA’s procedural error not to have been
harmless, the Third Circuit turned to the remedy.  It decided to
remand the matter to the EPA
with the direction that the Administrator shall forbear from
applying to [the plaintiffs] any of the requirements or sanc-
tions imposed on non-attainment areas by the 1977 amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act until the Administrator shall have
conducted a limited legislative hearing in which he gives [the
plaintiffs] the required statutory notice and opportunity for
participation and comment as provided by the APA . . . .49
The court held that requiring notice and a form of comment
under these circumstances would restore the plaintiffs, “as
nearly as possible, to the position they would have occupied if
the Administrator had afforded them their rights to prior notice
and an opportunity for comment.”50  But the court expressly
left the designations in place with respect to all parties besides
the plaintiffs, on the ground that vacating the designations
more generally would “endanger the Congressional scheme for
the control of air pollution.”51
In a pair of cases on the EPA’s designations, the Fifth Cir-
cuit took more or less the same tack as did the Third Circuit.52
It characterized the EPA’s reliance on postpromulgation notice
and comment as mixing “notions of mootness, harmless error,




49 Id. at 381–82.
50 Id. at 381.
51 Id.
52 City of Waco v. EPA, 620 F.2d 84, 86–87 (5th Cir. 1980); U.S. Steel Corp. v.
EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 211–14 (5th Cir. 1979).
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for upholding the rule because “accepting them would lead in
the long run to depriving parties affected by agency action of
any way to enforce their [§] 553 rights to prepromulgation no-
tice and comment.”53  The court further observed that there is a
“crucial difference between comments before and after rule
promulgation,” namely that, before promulgating a rule, an
“agency is more likely to give real consideration to alternative
ideas.”54  Only by requiring prepromulgation notice and com-
ment, the Fifth Circuit said, could judges ensure that inter-
ested parties have the opportunity “to make their views known
to the agency in time to influence the rule making process in a
meaningful way.”55  The court thought it was unlikely “that
persons would bother to submit their views or that the Secre-
tary would seriously consider their suggestions after the regu-
lations are a Fait accompli.”56  Ultimately, the court determined
that “[w]ere we to allow the EPA to prevail on this point we
would make the provisions of [§] 553 virtually unenforceable.
An agency that wished to dispense with prepromulgation notice
and comment could simply do so, invite postpromulgation
comment, and republish the regulation before a reviewing
court could act.”57
The Fifth Circuit, like the Third Circuit, also undertook a
harmless error analysis and ultimately found the EPA’s proce-
dural error not to be harmless.  Rather than expressly consid-
ering the relationship between the invalid designations and
future designations, however, the Fifth Circuit rested its analy-
sis on a presumption of prejudice in administrative cases in-
volving procedural errors:
While [the] doctrine [of harmless error] has been held applica-
ble to review of agency actions, and has statutory sanction in
the APA, it is to be used only ‘when a mistake of the adminis-
trative body is one that clearly had no bearing on the proce-
dure used or the substance of decision reached.’  Here the
Agency’s error plainly affected the procedure used, and we
cannot assume that there was no prejudice to petitioners.
Absence of such prejudice must be clear for harmless error to
be applicable.58
53 U.S. Steel Corp., 595 F.2d at 214.
54 Id.
55 Id. (quoting City of New York v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503, 517 (S.D.N.Y.
1974)).
56 Id. at 214–15 (quoting Diamond, 379 F. Supp. at 517).
57 Id. at 215.
58 Id. (quoting Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453,
466 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (footnote and citation omitted)).
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Unlike the Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit did not identify a
substantive harm arising from the lack of prepromulgation no-
tice and comment.  Rather, according to the Fifth Circuit, the
harm was the procedural error itself.59  Based on that error, the
Fifth Circuit set aside the challenged designations and re-
manded the matter to the EPA for proceedings consistent with
§ 553’s prepromulgation notice and comment requirements.60
Relying expressly on the Third and Fifth Circuits’ decisions
on point, the Eighth Circuit also concluded that the EPA’s al-
lowance of postpromulgation notice and comment did not cure
the procedural failings of the interim and final designations.61
Unlike the Third and Fifth Circuits, however, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the proper remedy was to “set aside the final
rule only as to the specific designations contested in this peti-
tion, but leave these designations in effect pending completion
of further administrative proceedings in accordance with the
APA [i.e., notice and comment].”62
The D.C. Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit—and, by
extension, the Third Circuit—in its assessment of “the psycho-
logical and bureaucratic realities of post hoc comments in rule-
making.”63  It therefore rejected the EPA’s argument that post-
promulgation notice and comment had cured the procedural
defects in the designations, noting that Congress’s decision to
require prepromulgation notice and comment was based on a
recognition that agencies are significantly less likely to revise a
rule once they have promulgated it than they are to revise it
based on comments received before a rule is promulgated.64
The key, the court held, was whether the agency had seriously
considered the comments it received after the interim designa-
tions had taken effect.65  To this end, the court pointed out that
even the two circuits to have found good cause for the EPA to
bypass prepromulgation notice and comment “had evidence
that the Agency had been sufficiently open-minded that it had
actually made changes in its rules in response to comments
received” during the postpromulgation period.66  The D.C. Cir-
cuit, however, found that, with respect to the designations
59 Id. at 210.
60 Id. at 215–18.
61 U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d 572, 575–76 (8th Cir. 1981).
62 Id. at 577.
63 State of N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1049–50 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
64 Id. at 1049.
65 Id. at 1050.
66 Id.
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there before it, the EPA had not “made any significant
changes . . . in response to [the petitioner’s postpromulgation]
comments.”67  The lack of changes based on postpromulgation
comments, the court said, undermined the EPA’s argument
that it had kept an open mind during postpromulgation notice
and comment, which in turn meant the EPA could not “rebut
the presumption that post hoc comment was not contemplated
by the APA and is generally not consonant with it.”68  The D.C.
Circuit thus invalidated the challenged designations and re-
manded the record for reconsideration after a new round of
notice and comment proceedings.69
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the issue of the effect of
postpromulgation notice and comment for the Clean Air Act
designations, but only obliquely.70  In a footnote, that court
noted that the EPA’s use of postpromulgation proceedings “of-
fer[ed] some support for the EPA’s argument that the petition-
ers have suffered no harm from the initial promulgation.”71
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that post-
promulgation notice and comment were insufficient to render
the procedural error harmless.72  Still, the court left the chal-
lenged designations in place while the deliberative process was
reenacted, in deference to the complexity of the regulatory pro-
cess and the desire to avoid thwarting operation of the Clean
Air Act.73
B. The Sex Offender Registration Regulations
The Attorney General’s application of the Sex Offender and
Registration Notification Act (SORNA), enacted by Congress in
2006,74 offers a much more recent example of the weight courts
accord to postpromulgation notice and comment proceedings.
SORNA established a national registration system for persons
convicted of sex offenses under state and federal laws.75  In
particular, SORNA “requires those convicted of certain sex
crimes to provide state governments with (and to update) infor-




70 See W. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 812 n.12 (9th Cir. 1980).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 812.
73 Id. at 812–13.
74 Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 109–248, 120
Stat. 590 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16991).
75 Id. at 593–94.
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state and federal sex offender registries”76 and imposes new
criminal penalties on a convicted sex offender if the offender (1)
is required to register under SORNA; (2) is a sex offender by
reason of a federal conviction or, alternatively, is a person who
“travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or enters or leaves,
or resides in, Indian country”; and (3) “knowingly fails to regis-
ter or update a registration as required” by SORNA.77
SORNA’s registration requirements were not immediately
applicable to persons convicted of a sex offense prior to
SORNA’s enactment.  Rather, the Act provided that the regis-
tration requirements would not apply to “pre-Act offenders un-
til the Attorney General specifie[d] that they [did] apply.”78  In
other words, Congress left the application of SORNA’s registra-
tion requirements to pre-Act offenders to the Attorney Gen-
eral’s discretion.  On February 28, 2007, the Attorney General
exercised that discretion and promulgated an interim-final rule
making SORNA’s registration requirements applicable to all
pre-Act offenders.79  The Attorney General did not offer
prepromulgation notice and comment, and he also bypassed
the APA’s thirty-day advance publication requirement, assert-
ing the good cause exception for both.80  In support of his good
cause claim, the Attorney General offered two rationales: (1)
that the government had to eliminate “any possible uncer-
tainty” about the applicability of SORNA; and (2) that further
delay would endanger the public.81
Notwithstanding his claim of good cause, in May 2007 the
Attorney General proposed a new set of guidelines—known as
the SMART guidelines—for implementing SORNA.82  In con-
trast to the interim-final rule, the Attorney General announced
that the SMART guidelines would be subjected to notice and
comment procedures.83  Like the interim-final rule, however,
the SMART guidelines provided that the SORNA guidelines ap-
plied to pre-Act offenders.84  After notice and comment, the
Attorney General published the final SMART guidelines on July
76 Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 978 (2012).
77 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2012).
78 Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 978; see also 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (granting the
Attorney General rulemaking authority regarding applicability).
79 See Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72
Fed. Reg. 8,894, 8,897 (Feb. 28, 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 72).
80 See id.
81 Id. at 8,896–97.
82 The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 72
Fed. Reg. 30,210, 30,210 (May 30, 2007).
83 See id. at 30,212.
84 Id. at 30,212–13.
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2, 2008, and those guidelines took effect on August 1, 2008.85
Like the earlier, interim-final rule, and using almost the exact
same language, the final SMART guidelines reaffirmed the ap-
plication of SORNA to pre-Act offenders.86  Subsequently, on
December 29, 2010, the Attorney General adopted a “final rule”
responding to comments received in response to the interim-
final rule and ratifying the interim-final rule for the roughly
eighteen months between February 2007 and August 2008.87
A number of pre-Act offenders were convicted of violating
SORNA’s registration requirement based on the interim-final
rule.  Several of these offenders challenged their convictions,
arguing that SORNA could not apply to them because, when
they were prosecuted, the Attorney General had not promul-
gated a valid rule making SORNA retroactive.88  The interim-
final rule was invalid, they claimed, because the Attorney Gen-
eral had not shown good cause for bypassing § 553’s
prepromulgation notice and comment requirements.89
Federal courts of appeals divided over the validity of the
Attorney General’s interim-final rule.  A few circuits accepted
the Attorney General’s good cause claim, thereby obviating the
need to evaluate his postpromulgation procedures.90  But sev-
eral other circuits found that the Attorney General’s stated
reasons for bypassing prepromulgation notice and comment
were insufficient.91  Consistent with the APA’s requirement
that courts reviewing agency decisions “[take] account . . . of
the rule of prejudicial error,”92 these five circuits then had to
consider whether the Attorney General’s procedural error in
85 See The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification,
73 Fed. Reg. 38,030, 38,030 (July 2, 2008).
86 Id. at 30,035–36.
87 See Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 75
Fed. Reg. 81,849 (Dec. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 72).
88 See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 766 F.3d 884, 890 (8th Cir. 2014);
United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 509 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v.
Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 928 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Valverde, 628 F.3d
1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir.
2010); United States v. Utesch, 596 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Cain, 583 F.3d 408, 412–24 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459
(4th Cir. 2009).
89 See, e.g., Dean, 604 F.3d at 1278; Utesch, 596 F.3d at 309–10.
90 See Dean, 604 F.3d at 1281 (quoting Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174, 1179
(D.C. Cir. 2004)); Gould, 568 F.3d at 469–70; see also United States v. Dixon, 551
F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting defendant’s APA argument as “frivolous”
without elaborating), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Carr v. United States, 560
U.S. 438 (2010).
91 Brewer, 766 F.3d at 890; Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 509; Johnson, 632 F.3d at
928; Valverde, 628 F.3d at 1168; Cain, 583 F.3d at 412–24.
92 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
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promulgating the interim-final rule was harmless.  Their an-
swers to that question were informed partially by how they
viewed the effect of the postpromulgation notice and comment
associated with adoption of the SMART guidelines.
Of the five circuit courts to address the issue, only the Fifth
Circuit found the procedural invalidity of the interim-final rule
to be harmless, so that the interim-final rule could be given
effect as to pre-Act offenders notwithstanding the lack of
prepromulgation notice and comment.93  The court reached
that conclusion for four reasons.  First, it pointed out that the
preamble of the interim-final rule addressed each of the argu-
ments the petitioner raised in his legal challenge.  “[T]he error
in failing to solicit public comment before issuing the rule was
not prejudicial,” it said, “because the Attorney General never-
theless considered the arguments [Petitioner] Johnson has as-
serted and responded to those arguments during the interim
rulemaking.”94  There was thus nothing to suggest that, “if
given the opportunity to comment, [Petitioner] Johnson would
have presented an argument the Attorney General did not con-
sider in issuing the interim rule.”95
Second, the Fifth Circuit deemed harmless the Attorney
General’s failure to undertake prepromulgation notice and
comment because the interim-final rule merely “involved a yes
or no decision”—i.e., whether to apply SORNA retroactively.96
To the Fifth Circuit’s eye, the issue addressed in the interim-
final rule did not require anything like “nuanced and detailed
regulations [of the sort] that greatly benefit from expert and
regulated entity participation,” a fact that further undercut the
need for prepromulgation notice and comment.97
The Fifth Circuit’s two remaining reasons for finding harm-
less error related directly to the Attorney General’s use of post-
promulgation notice and comment with respect to the SMART
guidelines.  First, the court noted that even when the Attorney
General gave notice and reviewed public comments in promul-
gating the SMART guidelines, the resulting rule was substan-
tively identical to the interim rule in regard to retroactivity.98
Thus, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, there was no basis for think-
93 Johnson, 632 F.3d at 928.
94 Id. at 932.
95 Id.; see also Dean, 604 F.3d at 1288–89 (Wilson, J., concurring) (raising a
nearly identical argument).
96 Johnson, 632 F.3d at 932.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 932–33.
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ing prepromulgation notice and comment would have altered
the content of the interim-final rule.99
The Fifth Circuit also determined that the petitioner’s fail-
ure to propose “comments he would have made during a com-
ment period” and his decision not to “involve himself in the
postpromulgation comment period” for the SMART guidelines
undermined his claim that the lack of prepromulgation notice
and comment for the interim-final rule harmed him.100  As the
court put it, “While [Petitioner] Johnson’s participation in these
alternate comment forums is not required to find prejudice, his
lack of involvement in all stages of administrative decision-
making points to the conclusion that Johnson was not practi-
cally harmed by the Attorney General’s APA failings.”101  The
Fifth Circuit, then, relied substantially on the Attorney Gen-
eral’s allowance of postpromulgation notice and comment in
deciding that the lack of prepromulgation notice and comment
with respect to the interim-final rule was harmless.102
The remaining four circuits to consider the issue—the
Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth103—held that the Attorney
General’s failure to engage in prepromulgation notice and com-
ment with respect to the interim-final rule was not harmless
error.  In doing so, these circuits expressly rejected the Fifth
Circuit’s arguments regarding the effect of postpromulgation
notice and comment.
A few of the courts began their analyses by noting the
Attorney General’s complete and total failure to undertake any
sort of prepromulgation notice and comment regarding the in-
terim rule, saying that such a failure—in contrast to, say, a
failure to comply with some minor technicality during the com-
ments process—drastically undermined the purposes of
§ 553’s notice and comment provisions.104  Because the retro-
activity provision in the interim-final rule was “never ‘tested via
exposure to diverse public comment,’” offenders prosecuted for




103 See United States v. Brewer, 766 F.3d 884, 890–91 (8th Cir. 2014); United
States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 509 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Valverde,
628 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408, 412–24
(6th Cir. 2009).
104 Brewer, 766 F.3d at 891; Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 519; see also United States
v. Utesch, 596 F.3d 302, 312 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Here, the process was fatally
flawed; the Attorney General provided affected parties no opportunity to partici-
pate in the crafting of the interim rule before it purported to take effect against
them.”).
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violating the interim-final rule were never given any opportu-
nity “to provide meaningful comments relating to the sub-
stance of the rule” or “[‘]develop evidence in the record’ to
enable more effective review.”105  The statement that there was
no opportunity to provide meaningful comments or develop evi-
dence in the administrative record effectively dismissed as
meaningless the postpromulgation notice and comment that
occurred in connection with the subsequently finalized guide-
lines.106  Indeed, two of the courts that rejected the Attorney
General’s harmless error argument—the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits—went so far as to suggest that giving effect to
postpromulgation notice and comment procedures in the con-
text of a criminal statute like SORNA risked violating the
Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause.107
Several of the four circuits rejected the Attorney General’s
arguments that postpromulgation notice and comment cured
the procedural defects in the interim-final rule because they
found no evidence that the Attorney General kept an open mind
during postpromulgation proceedings.108  Rather, the courts
attributed to the Attorney General a “single-minded commit-
ment to the substantive result reached” at the expense of con-
sidering alternative viewpoints.109  As evidence of the Attorney
General’s closed-mindedness, a few of the courts pointed to the
text of the interim-final rule’s preamble, which specified that
the interim-final rule was promulgated only as a precautionary
measure to “foreclose[ ] such claims [of pre-Act offenders] by
making it indisputably clear that SORNA applies to all sex of-
fenders (as the Act defines that term) regardless of when they
were convicted.”110  A mission to foreclose claims, they rea-
soned, was the opposite of the sort of open-mindedness re-
quired for meaningful notice and comment proceedings.111
105 Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 519 (quoting Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652
F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2011)).
106 See id. (“Any suggestion that the postpromulgation comments to the In-
terim Rule can satisfy these purposes misses the point.”).
107 See Valverde, 628 F.3d at 1168 n.3; Utesch, 596 F.3d at 312–13.
108 See, e.g., Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 519 (“The Government also has not shown
that the Attorney General ‘maintain[ed] a flexible and open-minded attitude to-
wards’ the Interim Rule.” (alteration in original) (quoting Prometheus Radio Pro-
ject, 652 F.3d at 449)); Utesch, 596 F.3d at 310 (“There was never any follow-up
publication corresponding to the interim regulation that evidenced actual consid-
eration of public commentary.”).
109 Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 519.
110 Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed.
Reg. 8,894, 8,896 (Feb. 28, 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 72).
111 See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 766 F.3d 884, 892 (8th Cir. 2014) (“Such
an approach certainly does not suggest the sort of ‘flexible and open-minded
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The Third Circuit went even further, pointing out that the tim-
ing of the rule—promulgated immediately after courts rejected
the Attorney General’s argument that SORNA applied retroac-
tively even without a rule so specifying—suggested the Attor-
ney General promulgated the rule to advance a specific,
predetermined agenda.112  The weight of evidence suggesting
the Attorney General had already made up his mind on retroac-
tivity when he gave notice and solicited comment on the
SMART guidelines, the courts concluded, undercut the mean-
ingfulness of postpromulgation notice and comment
procedures.113
Courts were equally skeptical of the other arguments on
which the Fifth Circuit relied regarding the effectiveness of
postpromulgation notice and comment in mitigating the in-
terim-final rule’s procedural shortcomings.  A few courts, for
example, rejected the argument that a petitioner’s failure to
participate in a postpromulgation comment period negated any
possibility that the petitioner was prejudiced by the lack of
prepromulgation notice and comment.114  Nothing, they
pointed out, requires a petitioner to participate in a rulemaking
before a court may find prejudice.115  Indeed, one of the pur-
poses of notice and comment is to allow other groups to raise a
regulated party’s interests from a variety of perspectives, rather
than requiring a regulated party to do so itself.116
Two courts likewise dismissed the argument that, because
the final rule did not depart from the reasoning or substance of
the interim-final rule, even after notice and comment, there
had been no prejudice to any of the petitioners.117  This analy-
sis, the courts concluded, would allow agencies to avoid notice
attitude towards its own rules,’ that is generally required for the notice-and-
comment period.” (quoting Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 449)); Reynolds,
710 F.3d at 519 (“The Government also has not shown that the Attorney General
‘maintain[ed] a flexible and open-minded attitude towards’ the Interim Rule.”
(quoting Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 449)).
112 See Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 520.
113 See id. at 519 (“The Attorney General thus states that the purpose of the
Interim Rule is to eliminate any dissenting points of view . . . . Under those
circumstances, the Interim Rule can hardly be seen as fulfilling the purposes of
notice and comment.”).
114 See, e.g., Brewer, 766 F.3d at 891 (noting that the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning
in United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 2012), is unpersuasive);
Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 522 (disagreeing with government’s reliance on the Fifth
Circuit’s decision).
115 Brewer, 766 F.3d at 891; Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 522–23.
116 See Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 522–23 (“If a comment period had been pro-
vided, others who could have asserted his interest—such as public defenders and
public-interest groups—would almost certainly have weighed in.”).
117 See Brewer, 766 F.3d at 891–92; Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 522–23.
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and comment by simply issuing an interim-final rule and sub-
sequently adopting it—or something substantively identical to
it—as a final rule after notice and comment.118  Countenancing
or validating that behavior by an agency, they concluded,
would eviscerate notice and comment requirements.119
Not only did several circuits reject the argument that post-
promulgation notice and comment helped render harmless the
invalid interim-final rule, the Third Circuit actually used the
postpromulgation comments to demonstrate that the Attorney
General’s prepromulgation analysis had not adequately consid-
ered potential arguments relating to the interim-final rule.120
Specifically, it identified a number of arguments raised in com-
ments to the SMART guidelines that were not addressed in the
preamble to the interim rule, including several comments advo-
cating alternatives to across-the-board retroactivity—a possi-
bility not mentioned in the interim rule.121  By demonstrating
that the Attorney General had not considered alternatives to
across-the-board retroactivity for all sex offenders, the Third
Circuit found, the results of the postpromulgation comment
undercut the notion that the lack of prepromulgation notice
and comment had been harmless.
C. The Tax Basis Overstatement Cases
A third line of cases in which courts wrestled with the effect
of postpromulgation notice and comment involves regulations
issued by the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS)122 addressing the time period
for assessing a tax deficiency—i.e., telling a taxpayer that it
failed to pay enough taxes with its annual tax return.  Under
§ 6501 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), the ordinary time
for assessing a deficiency is within three years after the tax-
118 Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 523; United States v. Utesch, 596 F.3d 302 (6th Cir.
2010).
119 Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 523; Utesch, 596 F.3d at 312.
120 Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 520–21.
121 Id. at 522.
122 The Internal Revenue Code delegates authority for promulgating regula-
tions to Treasury.  I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012).  Treasury formally issues all regula-
tions interpreting the IRC, and Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy is significantly
involved in reviewing and drafting Treasury regulations.  I.R.M. § 32.1.1.3.1(1)(A)
(Aug. 11, 2004).  Historically, however, the Office of Chief Counsel of the IRS has
performed the function of initially drafting most Treasury regulations. See id.
§§ 32.1.1.3, 32.1.1.3.1(1)(A), 32.1.1.4.5(1) (Aug. 11, 2004) (documenting the joint
agency role in regulation drafting).  Accordingly, Treasury and the IRS are both
recognized as the issuer of the regulations discussed in this Part.
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payer in question files its tax return.123  That period is ex-
tended to six years, however, when a taxpayer “omits from
gross income an amount properly includible therein [which] is
in excess of 25% of the amount of gross income stated in the
return.”124
Availing itself of the six-year extended period, the IRS as-
sessed deficiencies against a number of taxpayers who, be-
tween three and six years earlier, had overstated the bases—
and thereby understated the gains realized—on property sold.
In litigation over those assessments, the IRS argued that such
basis overstatements represented omissions from gross in-
come, thereby triggering the six-year extended limitations pe-
riod for assessing deficiencies.125  Decades earlier, in Colony,
Inc. v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court had concluded that
virtually identical language in an earlier version of the IRC did
not encompass basis overstatements.126  After two federal cir-
cuit courts relied on Colony to reject the IRS’s interpretation of
the contemporary IRC § 6501,127 and while litigation in several
other cases remained pending, Treasury promulgated a “tem-
porary” regulation—which, by its terms, was immediately effec-
tive—codifying its position that an overstatement in basis was
the same thing, for purposes of the statute of limitations, as an
understatement of gain.128  Treasury did not rely on the good
cause exception; instead, Treasury and the IRS contend that
most Treasury regulations interpreting the IRC are exempt
from notice-and-comment rulemaking as interpretative
rules129—itself a controversial position.130  Regardless, after
adopting the temporary rule, Treasury utilized postpromulga-
123 I.R.C. § 6501(a).
124 Id. § 6501(e)(1)(A).
125 See Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2009); Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm’r, 568 F.3d 767, 774–75 (9th Cir.
2009).
126 357 U.S. 28, 35–36 (1958).
127 Salman Ranch, 573 F.3d at 1372; Bakersfield Energy Partners, 568 F.3d at
768, 775–78.
128 Definition of Omission from Gross Income, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,321, 49,323
(Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301).
129 I.R.M. § 32.1.1.2.6 (Sept. 23, 2011) (“Most IRS/Treasury regulations are
considered interpretative because the underlying statute implemented by the reg-
ulation contains the necessary legal authority for the action taken and any effect
of the regulation flows directly from that statute.”); Jeremiah Coder, ABA Section
of Taxation Meeting: Treasury Views Most Regs as Outside Notice and Comment
Rules, 139 TAX NOTES 884, 884 (2013).
130 See Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211, 240–45
(2010) (Halpern & Holmes, JJ., concurring) (rejecting this claim); Coder, supra
note 129, at 884 (documenting disagreement). R
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tion notice and comment procedures, ultimately finalizing the
rule without substantive amendment.131
Throughout this rulemaking process, litigation over the
government’s interpretation of IRC § 6501 continued.  The is-
sue raised most prominently in these cases was whether Trea-
sury’s interpretation of the IRC, as embodied in the new rule,
was entitled to deference under the Supreme Court’s Chevron
standard.132  For an agency’s interpretation of a statute to be
entitled to Chevron deference, of course, the statute must be
ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation thereof must be
permissible.133  The United States Tax Court and some circuit
courts concluded, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Colony, that Treasury’s temporary and final regulations both
were inconsistent with the plain meaning of IRC § 6501 and
thus invalid at Chevron’s first step.134  Several other circuits
upheld Treasury’s regulation as a permissible construction of
the statute at Chevron step two.135  In several cases, however,
parties or amici asserted that the rule was also procedurally
invalid for Treasury’s reliance on only postpromulgation notice
and comment, leading to some discussion of that issue as
well.136
Judges Halpern and Holmes of the United States Tax Court
offered the most thorough consideration of Treasury’s proce-
dures.  While the majority of that court rejected Treasury’s tem-
porary rule at Chevron step one, Judges Halpern and Holmes,
writing in concurrence, instead declared the rule “procedurally
invalid under the [APA].”137  Disagreeing with the government’s
assertion that its regulations were exempt from notice-and-
comment rulemaking requirements, Judges Halpern and
Holmes stressed that, “[g]iving the public the opportunity to
participate through notice and comment is important in giving
131 Definition of Omission from Gross Income, 75 Fed. Reg. 78,897 (Dec. 17,
2010) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301).
132 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45
(1984).
133 Id. at 842–43.
134 Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 257 (4th
Cir. 2011); Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 360 (5th Cir. 2011); Intermoun-
tain Ins. Serv. of Vail, 134 T.C. at 224.
135 Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 650 F.3d 691, 707 (D.C.
Cir. 2011); Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 647 F.3d 929, 939–40 (10th Cir.
2011); Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Beard v. Comm’r, 633 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2011).
136 Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, 650 F.3d at 709–10; Salman Ranch, 647
F.3d at 940; Grapevine Imports, 636 F.3d at 1380–81.
137 Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, 134 T.C. at 238 (Halpern & Holmes, JJ.,
concurring).
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regulations legitimacy.”138  Although the regulation was still
temporary at the time it came before the Tax Court, Judges
Halpern and Holmes suggested that they would have held the
succeeding final regulation invalid as well, because “[g]iving the
public a chance to comment only after making the regulations
effective does not comply with the APA” and “courts invalidate
even final regulations when an agency does this.”139  After
Treasury finalized the regulation, the Fifth Circuit invalidated it
at Chevron step one, but alternatively (and quite flatly) held
that Treasury’s offer of “notice and comment after the final
Regulations were enacted [was] not an acceptable substitute
for prepromulgation notice and comment.”140
The outright rejection of postpromulgation notice and com-
ment by Judges Halpern and Holmes and the Fifth Circuit put
those courts at odds with the D.C. Circuit.  In reviewing the Tax
Court’s decision, the D.C. Circuit declared not only that Trea-
sury’s basis omission regulation was permissible at Chevron
step two but also that postpromulgation notice and comment
proceedings could cure the procedural defect in the final regu-
lation so long as the IRS kept an “open mind” during those
proceedings.141  The court found the requisite open-minded-
ness in the record, rejecting each of the arguments raised by
plaintiffs and amici.142  First, the court noted that, although
the IRS, in finalizing the regulation, had not responded to sev-
eral of the arguments raised by the litigants in the case, he had
responded in some depth to the only comment he received after
the IRS gave notice that it was accepting comments on the
temporary regulation.143  The court acknowledged that the
Commissioner had not changed the content of the regulation
based on the comment, but it observed that the lack of changes
to the regulation, by itself, did not mean the IRS had not con-
sidered the comment and kept an open mind in evaluating
it.144  The court highlighted the thoroughness of the IRS’s re-
sponse to the one comment he received, concluding that,
“[g]iven the Commissioner’s ‘searching consideration’ of the
comment, we have no doubt that he kept the requisite open
138 Id. at 246.
139 Id. at 247.
140 Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 360 n.9 (5th Cir. 2011).
141 Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, 650 F.3d at 709.
142 Id. at 710.
143 Id. at 709–10.
144 Id.
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mind.”145  Because the court found that the IRS had kept an
open mind throughout the postpromulgation notice-and-com-
ment process, the court concluded that postpromulgation no-
tice and comment had cured the lack of prepromulgation notice
and comment with respect to Treasury’s regulation.146
The Federal Circuit was even more willing than the D.C.
Circuit to enforce Treasury’s regulation, summarily dismissing
the argument that, because the final regulation was first issued
in temporary form without notice and comment, it was invalid.
Sweeping that notion aside, the Federal Circuit declared, “[n]ow
that the regulations have issued in final form, these arguments
are moot.  There can be little doubt that the final regulations of
the Treasury Department are entitled to Chevron review and,
where appropriate, deference.”147  The Tenth Circuit, citing the
Federal Circuit precedent, likewise adopted the position—
again, without much explanation—that an invalid temporary
regulation becomes valid so long as it is, at some point, sub-
jected to public comment.148
Finally, the Seventh Circuit took still another approach,
appearing to credit Treasury’s claim that its regulation was
valid under the interpretative rule exception.  In dicta address-
ing whether the regulation might merit Chevron deference, the
court said that it “would have been inclined to grant” Chevron
deference to both the temporary regulation and the final one
issued after postpromulgation notice and comment.149  The
court elaborated that it had “previously given deference to in-
terpretive Treasury regulations issued with [postpromulgation]
notice-and-comment procedures, and the Supreme Court has
stated that the absence of notice-and-comment procedures is
not dispositive to the finding of Chevron deference.”150
II
SYNTHESIZING THE JURISPRUDENCE
As illustrated by these three case studies, jurisprudence
concerning judicial review of postpromulgation notice and
comment procedures on procedurally invalid interim-final
rules is a muddle.  The circuit courts have adopted at least five
145 Id. at 710 (quoting Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway
Admin., 28 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
146 Id.
147 Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
148 Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 647 F.3d 929, 940 (10th Cir. 2011).
149 Beard v. Comm’r, 633 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2011).
150 Id. (citations omitted).
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distinct approaches to addressing such cases.  Although each
approach has something to commend it, none is perfect.
A. Postpromulgation Procedures as Irretrievably Flawed
A few courts have declined to give any effect to postpromul-
gation notice and comment.151  This is largely because, as the
Fifth Circuit has explained, giving effect to postpromulgation
notice and comment would ignore
the crucial difference between comments before and after
rule promulgation.  Section 553 is designed to ensure that
affected parties have an opportunity to participate in and
influence agency decision making at an early stage, when the
agency is more likely to give real consideration to alternative
ideas. . . .  Were we to [credit postpromulgation notice and
comment,] we would make the provisions of [§] 553 virtually
unenforceable.  An agency that wished to dispense with pre-
promulgation notice and comment could simply do so, invite
post-promulgation comment, and republish the regulation
before a reviewing court could act.152
The crux of the argument is twofold.  First, giving effect to
postpromulgation rulemaking would undoubtedly provide a
powerful disincentive for agencies to comply with § 553’s
prepromulgation notice and comment requirements when they
seek to bind the actions of regulated parties.153  Notice-and-
comment rulemaking takes time, ranging from months to
years.  While agencies may perceive value in obtaining outside
input regarding their rulemaking initiatives, they may also
sometimes see notice and comment procedures as an obstacle
to getting things done and may be predisposed to interpret the
exemptions from those requirements aggressively.  To the ex-
tent agencies can rely on postpromulgation notice and com-
151 See, e.g., Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 360 n.9 (5th Cir. 2011)
(“That the government allowed for notice and comment after the final Regulations
were enacted is not an acceptable substitute for pre-promulgation notice and
comment.”); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 222 (4th Cir. 1975) (“We emphasize
again . . . that, in light of the ‘drastic impact’ which compliance with regulations
such as this will have, adherence to applicable statutory provisions is neces-
sary.”); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1020 (3d Cir. 1972) (“Section
4(b) of the [APA] requires notice before rulemaking, not after.  The right of inter-
ested persons to petition for the issuance, amendment or repeal of a rule, granted
in Section 4(e) of that Act, is neither a substitute for nor an alternative to compli-
ance with the mandatory notice requirements of Section 4(b).”).
152 U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 214–15 (5th Cir. 1979) (citations
omitted).
153 Id. at 214 (“[A]ccepting [postpromulgation notice and comment] would lead
in the long run to depriving parties affected by agency action of any way to enforce
their [§] 553 rights to prepromulgation notice and comment.”).
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ment to prop up procedurally invalid rules, they will be less
inclined to follow the APA’s procedural requirements faith-
fully.154  By contrast, rigorous insistence on prepromulgation
notice and comment—and nothing less—ensures scrupulous
fidelity to the text of APA § 553.
Second, ignoring postpromulgation notice and comment
acknowledges the intuitive difference in the way agencies are
likely to treat pre- and postpromulgation comments.  Once an
agency has publicly staked out a position and given effect to
that position, the argument goes, forces like regulatory inertia,
status quo bias,155 confirmation bias,156 and commitment
bias157 all make it less likely the agency will deviate from its
position.  Stephanie Stern has suggested, for example, that the
APA’s notice-and-comment process itself reduces effective pub-
lic participation in agency rulemaking by prematurely commit-
ting agency officials to a single set of proposed rules and
increasing perceptions of agency bias in favor of one approach
to a particular problem.158  Assuming Stern’s hypothesis is cor-
rect, it is reasonable to infer that deferring notice and comment
until after an agency publishes binding interim-final regula-
tions would only exacerbate this phenomenon.  In fact, the Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States expressed
precisely this concern about the practice of interim-final regu-
lations, particularly in the absence of good cause, to discourage
agency utilization of that model.159  An approach that ignores
postpromulgation notice and comment thus focuses on com-
ments received at the time when, at least theoretically, the
agency is most likely to be receptive.
There are at least two other clear benefits of denying effect
to postpromulgation notice and comment, both having to do
154 See Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“To avoid gutting the APA’s procedural requirements, harmless error analysis in
administrative rulemaking must therefore focus on the process as well as the
result.”).
155 William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988).
156 William E. Kovacic, Creating a Respected Brand: How Regulatory Agencies
Signal Quality, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 253 (2015); Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive
Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL
L. REV. 486, 504 (2002).
157 Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146
U. PA. L. REV. 101, 142–43 (1997).
158 Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Adminis-
trative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 620–30 (2002).
159 Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,111–12 (Aug. 18,
1995).
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with the way the public might perceive postpromulgation notice
and comment.  As some scholars have argued, citizens might
not take seriously the opportunity to offer comments after a
rule is in effect, believing that, because an agency has already
committed to enforcing a particular rule, submitting comments
would just be a waste of time.160  If a substantial portion of the
public does not think it worthwhile to submit comments, that
undermines the crowdsourcing rational of the notice and com-
ment requirements.  Thus, at least insomuch as the public is
likely to treat the opportunity for prepromulgation comment
more seriously than the opportunity for postpromulgation
comment, postpromulgation notice and comment constitute an
inadequate substitute for prepromulgation notice and
comment.
Analogous reasoning can support an argument that post-
promulgation notice and comment do not legitimize regulations
to the same extent as prepromulgation notice and comment.
To the extent the public is more likely to participate in
prepromulgation comment periods—or just more likely to be-
lieve that prepromulgation notice and comment incorporate
the full spectrum of public views on a rule—notice and com-
ment procedures strengthen the perception that the resulting
rules are the product of something resembling a democratic
process.  This, in turn, minimizes the degree to which the re-
sulting rules are seen as democratically illegitimate.161  By con-
trast, if the public feels shut out of the regulatory process—as
it might with postpromulgation notice and comment—the re-
sulting rules will inevitably be perceived as less the product of a
representative process and more the product of bureaucratic
fiat.162  Refusing to give effect to postpromulgation notice and
comment, then, might make sense from a legitimacy
perspective.
Predictably, however, there are problems with disregarding
postpromulgation notice and comment procedures entirely.  As
a practical matter, for example, doing so would mean that
thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of pages of regula-
tions—all supported only by postpromulgation notice and com-
160 Stern, supra note 158, at 620–30. R
161 Cf. Thomas A. Albright, Note, Regulator Disqualification from Rulemaking
Proceedings, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1193, 1214 (1979) (“But for public participation to be
more than a hollow formality in rulemaking proceedings, a regulator’s initial views
must be tentative, and must be perceived to be tentative.”).
162 Ronald M. Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 16
(1995).
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ment—are almost certainly invalid.163  From an administrative
perspective, such wholesale invalidation of large numbers of
agency regulations would be hugely destabilizing.  Of course,
agencies might go to the trouble of repromulgating the rules,
but doing so would entail huge expenditures of time and other
agency resources.164  Such expenditures are particularly
troubling with respect to the many rules that were previously
finalized using postpromulgation notice and comment and
have been in effect for years or even decades without being
challenged.  While agencies sift through the wreckage, parties
that have reasonably relied upon those regulations would face
tremendous uncertainty regarding their rights and obligations
under the law.
Second, a bright-line rule that postpromulgation notice
and comment can never be an adequate substitute for
prepromulgation notice and comment arguably ignores the
doctrine of harmless error codified in § 706 of the APA.  The
harmless error doctrine might be read to counsel that, to the
extent a substitute procedure fulfills the essential functions of
prepromulgation notice and comment, there is no need to insist
on prepromulgation notice and comment over the substitute
procedure.165  This is not to say that postpromulgation notice
and comment necessarily fulfill the essential functions of
prepromulgation notice and comment.  As explained above,
there are good reasons to think they do not, at least not in all
cases.  But it is also reasonable to believe that, in at least some
instances, postpromulgation notice and comment will function
at least as well as prepromulgation notice and comment, and in
those cases a blanket rule precluding judicial consideration of
postpromulgation notice and comment procedures will be
detrimental.
163 The GAO study discussed in the introduction to this Article alone contem-
plated approximately 13,400 potentially problematic rules, constituting an un-
specified number of pages in the Federal Register, and that study only covered
rules adopted from 2003 through 2010. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 1, at 8.  As indicated, agency use of postpromulgation notice and R
comment procedures began long before 2003. See, e.g., supra subpart I.A. (docu-
menting one instance from the late 1970s).
164 Todd Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Adminis-
trative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 165 (2000) (“Promulgating a major rule
[under notice and comment proceedings] often takes years and represents a sub-
stantial commitment of an agency’s resources.”).
165 See, e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760, 768–69 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding that violation of the statutory notice requirement was a harm-
less error since the purpose of the public participation requirement was fulfilled
through other means).
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This second point acknowledges the reality that, even if
they are not a perfect substitute for prepromulgation notice
and comment, postpromulgation notice and comment almost
certainly achieve, at least to some extent and perhaps even in
most instances, many of the goals underlying § 553’s
prepromulgation notice and comment requirements.  It is pos-
sible, for example, that an agency will not give as much credit
to a comment received after an interim-final rule is promul-
gated as the agency would give to the same comment received
before the interim-final rule was promulgated.  Nevertheless,
the agency might still give some credit to comments received
after the interim-final rule is promulgated.166  By completely
ignoring the effect of postpromulgation notice and comment,
then, courts disincentivize procedures that have at least some
value, and that should accordingly be encouraged.167
Indeed, rejecting postpromulgation notice and comment
outright as a potential cure for procedural flaws might have the
paradoxical effect of completely robbing the public of any op-
portunity to comment on a rule.  For instance, an agency might
promulgate a rule without prepromulgation notice and com-
ment under the good cause exception, genuinely believing its
claim of good cause is valid.  Under such circumstances, as a
matter of good governance, ACUS recommends that the agency
offer interested parties the opportunity to submit postpromul-
gation comments and publish its response to the comments
received.168  Judicial recognition that postpromulgation notice
and comment procedures have some value will offer agencies
an additional incentive to follow ACUS’s recommendation—
that of protecting the rule from being invalidated by a judge
who disagrees with the agency’s good cause claim.  But if an
agency knows the courts will not give any effect to postpromul-
gation notice and comment, the agency has substantially less
incentive to open the rule up to postpromulgation public com-
ment as a backstop to the agency’s good cause claim.  Thus, in
at least some circumstances, a court’s refusal to credit post-
promulgation notice and comment might actually induce agen-
cies to forego public comment altogether—a result inconsistent
with both ACUS good governance recommendations and the
principles underlying § 553.
166 See, e.g., Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 187 (1st Cir. 1983) (docu-
menting an instance in which a final rule reflected “some changes” made in
response to postpromulgation comments received in response to an interim rule).
167 Id. at 188 (“[C]omment after the fact is better than none at all.”).
168 Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,113 (Aug. 18,
1995).
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B. Postpromulgation Procedures as Perfect Substitute
At the other extreme, some courts have treated post-
promulgation notice and comment as curing or mooting proce-
dural defects in interim-final rules.169  This approach has a
number of practical advantages.  For one thing, allowing agen-
cies to substitute postpromulgation notice and comment for
prepromulgation notice and comment gives agencies greater
flexibility in promulgating rules.  Consider, for example, a situ-
ation in which an agency is genuinely uncertain whether a
particular rule qualifies for the good cause exception.  Courts
that do not give any effect to postpromulgation notice and com-
ment effectively leave the agency with just two options—pro-
mulgation under the good cause exception or prepromulgation
notice and comment—no matter how unpalatable each alterna-
tive might seem.  Courts that respect postpromulgation notice
and comment, however, give agencies a third option: promul-
gate the rule now as an interim-final rule under the good cause
exception and then backstop it with postpromulgation notice
and comment before promulgating it as a final rule.  This ap-
proach allows agencies to reap the benefits of quick enforce-
ment as well as the benefits of the notice-and-comment
process.  It also offers some security to agencies that have a
good faith belief that a particular rule qualifies for an exception
from prepromulgation notice and comment.  Those agencies
can take advantage of the exception but then further ensure
the rule’s validity by undertaking postpromulgation notice and
comment.
Crediting postpromulgation notice and comment will inevi-
tably lead agencies to use it more frequently.  In at least some
circumstances, that will mean opportunities for public com-
ment where agencies would otherwise provide none.  Again,
consider the scenario where an agency believes in good faith
that a contemplated rule qualifies for the good cause exception.
If postpromulgation notice and comment are not an option, the
agency will likely go ahead and promulgate the rule under the
169 See, e.g., Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 647 F.3d 929, 940 (10th Cir.
2011) (“While the . . . temporary regulations were issued without notice and
comment, [n]ow that the regulations have issued in final form [after postpromul-
gation notice and comment], these arguments are moot.” (first alteration in origi-
nal) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States,
636 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Grapevine also argues that the temporary
Treasury regulations should not receive Chevron deference because of purported
procedural shortcomings in their issuance.  Now that the regulations have issued
in final form [after postpromulgation notice and comment], these arguments are
moot.”).
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exception, meaning there will be no opportunity for public com-
ment on the rule.  If, however, postpromulgation notice and
comment are an option, the agency might, out of an abundance
of caution, promulgate the rule as an interim-final rule, subject
it to postpromulgation notice and comment, and only afterward
promulgate the rule as a final rule.  In that case, even assum-
ing the rule does, in fact, qualify under the good cause excep-
tion, the effect of courts’ crediting postpromulgation notice and
comment fosters greater public participation in the regulatory
process.
What the above discussion implicitly acknowledges is that,
at some level, the jurisprudence evaluating exceptions from
prepromulgation notice and comment is notoriously murky.170
In many instances, agencies will be forced to make borderline
decisions about whether an exception from prepromulgation
notice and comment applies.171  If an agency makes such a
decision in good faith and then pursues postpromulgation no-
tice and comment to shore up the rule procedurally in the event
a court finds they wrongly asserted an exception, it might be
unduly punitive—not to mention impractical—to require the
agency to go back to the drawing board and start from scratch
in promulgating the new rule.  Indeed, to the extent courts
invalidate rules for lack of prepromulgation notice and com-
ment to punish an agency’s conscious disregard of the public’s
interest in contributing to regulation, such punishment makes
little sense if the agency truly believed a recognized exception
from notice and comment requirements applied.
On a more practical level, treating postpromulgation notice
and comment as an acceptable substitute for prepromulgation
notice and comment avoids the unpalatable alternative of call-
ing into question the validity of hundreds of thousands of pages
of rules.  If postpromulgation notice and comment are not an
acceptable substitute for prepromulgation notice and com-
ment, agencies will likely be forced to start from scratch and
repromulgate all of the affected rules, something that will re-
quire a sizable expenditure of agency resources in the name of
an arguably redundant effort.
170 Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and “Spurious”
Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 4–5, n.10 (1994) (documenting
judicial complaints regarding the difficulty in evaluating exceptions for
prepromulgation notice).
171 See id. at 4 (“But the APA and indeed our constitutional system make the
chore of confronting these questions an inescapable one.”); see also Keith B. Hall,
Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 19 BUFF.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 41 (2012) (offering one example).
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But treating postpromulgation notice and comment as a
perfect substitute for prepromulgation notice and comment
has its share of problems.  First, it effectively reads § 553’s
prepromulgation notice and comment requirements out of the
statute, allowing agencies to instead undertake notice and
comment at whatever time they find most convenient.  Indeed,
from an administrative standpoint, it is hard to see why an
agency would ever go to the trouble of undertaking prepromul-
gation notice and comment when it could more easily promul-
gate an interim-final rule now and then undertake
postpromulgation notice and comment more or less at its lei-
sure.  This is why many courts have held that, “[t]o avoid gut-
ting the APA’s procedural requirements,” courts must “focus on
the process as well as the result.”172
Furthermore, as already noted, to the extent agencies are
already “locked in” to a particular rule at the prepromulgation
stage, that path commitment will only be stronger if, by the
time the agency solicits public comment, it has already enacted
an enforceable interim-final rule.173  Not only is this the result
suggested by well-established social science,174 but it is con-
firmed anecdotally.  In casual conversation, for example, a
Treasury official relayed that Treasury and the IRS typically
put a lot more effort into temporary Treasury regulations than
proposed ones, for the simple reason that temporary regula-
tions are legally binding and proposed ones are not.175  If agen-
cies are less likely to take seriously postpromulgation
comments than they are prepromulgation comments, it is hard
to argue convincingly that postpromulgation notice and com-
ment are a meaningful substitute for prepromulgation notice
and comment.
172 Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th Cir. 1992);
see also, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 517 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting
that the risk of gutting procedural requirements “is genuine because ‘[a]n agency
is not required to adopt a rule that conforms in any way to the comments
presented to it’” (quoting Riverbend Farms, 958 F.2d at 1487) (alteration in
original)).
173 See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Dep’t of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 380 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (“Indeed, if the FAA had entertained prepromulgation comments and
taken those comments seriously, it might very well have averted the public outcry
underlying the agency’s pending notice of proposed rulemaking.”).
174 See, e.g., Stern, supra note 158, at 590–600 (compiling the social science R
literature).
175 Cf. Hickman, supra note 26, at 1759–60 (discussing the legal weight of R
Treasury regulations).
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C. The Open Mind Standard
Postpromulgation notice and comment procedures need
not be treated as an all-or-nothing proposition.  The D.C. Cir-
cuit, for example, has at times championed a middle ground—
the open mind standard—whereby the court will uphold a rule
that was only subjected to postpromulgation notice and com-
ment if, during the postpromulgation notice-and-comment pe-
riod, the agency kept an “open mind” with respect to the
comments it received.176  While other courts have considered
an agency’s open-mindedness in evaluating the effect of post-
promulgation comments,177 the D.C. Circuit is clearly the open
mind standard’s leading exponent.
The challenge in applying this standard is, of course, deter-
mining when an agency has kept a sufficiently open mind re-
garding postpromulgation comments.  The D.C. Circuit has
attempted to place the burden on the agency, requiring a “com-
pelling showing” of open-mindedness by the agency to over-
come a presumption that an agency did not meaningfully
consider postpromulgation comments.178  To date, the D.C.
Circuit has identified just two criteria by which an agency can
demonstrate that it kept the requisite open mind.  First, the
agency can change or revise a regulation in response to post-
promulgation comments.179  Although failing to amend a regu-
lation in response to postpromulgation comments is not proof
of a closed mind,180 the D.C. Circuit has stated that changing
the regulation affirmatively indicates open-mindedness.181
Second, the D.C. Circuit has said that careful or “searching”
176 See, e.g., Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28
F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Reeder v. FCC, 865 F.2d 1298, 1304 (D.C. Cir.
1989); McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1323 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
177 See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 519 (3d Cir. 2013);
Mortg. Inv’rs Corp. of Ohio v. Gober, 220 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
178 Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety, 28 F.3d at 1292 (quoting McLouth
Steel Prods. Corp., 838 F.2d at 1323); Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., 900 F.2d at
379–80 (“Although we have suggested that there might be circumstances in which
‘defects in an original notice [could] be cured by an adequate later notice’ and
opportunity to comment, we have emphasized that we could reach such a conclu-
sion only upon a compelling showing that ‘the agency’s mind remain[ed] open
enough at the later stage.’” (quoting McLouth Steel Prods. Corp., 838 F.2d at 1323)
(alteration in original)).
179 Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety, 28 F.3d at 1292.
180 Id.
181 See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., 900 F.2d at 380 (“The FAA has not come close
to overcoming the presumption of closed-mindedness in this case.  It made no
changes . . . in response to public comments.”).
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consideration of the comments—particularly by addressing
them in the preamble to a final rule—evinces an open mind.182
The open mind approach possesses some appealing fea-
tures.  It is, for one thing, at least superficially consistent with
a central purpose of prepromulgation notice-and-comment
rulemaking, insofar as it ostensibly ensures that the public is
given the opportunity to offer meaningful input into a rule.183
After all, so long as a court has assured itself that the agency
actually considered the comments before promulgating the fi-
nal rule, why should the timing of the comments matter?
The open mind standard also has the virtue of giving agen-
cies the flexibility to rely sometimes on postpromulgation no-
tice and comment to shore up interim-final rules promulgated
under exceptions from § 553’s prepromulgation requirements.
That, in turn, makes it easier for agencies to rely on those
sometimes murky exceptions, even in close cases, where the
agencies nevertheless have a good-faith belief the exceptions
apply.  In that way, the open mind standard alleviates some of
the worst effects of the murkiness surrounding the § 553
exceptions.
Finally, the open mind standard has some basis in the text
of the APA.  The D.C. Circuit has implicitly rooted the open
mind standard in the harmless error rule codified in APA
§ 706.184  Doing so makes sense, since the question underlying
the open mind standard is whether the agency treated post-
promulgation comments differently from the way it would have
treated prepromulgation comments, i.e., whether the change in
timing was at all prejudicial.185
182 Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety, 28 F.3d at 1293; Air Transp. Ass’n of
Am., 900 F.2d at 380.
183 See United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 931 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The
purpose of notice-and-comment rulemaking is to ‘assure[ ] fairness and mature
consideration of rules having a substantial impact on those regulated.’  The pro-
cess allows the agency to ‘educate itself before adopting a final order.’  In addition,
public notice requires the agency to disclose its thinking on matters that will
affect regulated parties.” (footnotes omitted) (alteration in original)).
184 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
185 United States v. Stevenson, 676 F.3d 557, 565 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he key to
whether an agency’s procedural error in promulgating a rule is harmless hinges
not on whether the same rule would have issued absent the error, but whether the
affected parties had sufficient opportunity to weigh in on the proposed rule.”);
Green Island Power Auth. v. FERC, 577 F.3d 148, 165 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Thus, we
will not disturb FERC’s orders if we can determine that the outcome of the admin-
istrative proceedings will be the same absent FERC’s error.”); PDK Labs. Inc. v.
U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“If the
agency’s mistake did not affect the outcome, if it did not prejudice the petitioner, it
would be senseless to vacate and remand for reconsideration.”); Friends of Iwo
Jima v. Nat’l Capital Planning Comm’n, 176 F.3d 768, 774 (4th Cir. 1999).
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The open mind standard is not perfect, however.  Judges
are not clairvoyant, and a judge can glean only so much from
an agency’s response to postpromulgation comments.  An
agency’s thorough discussion of a particular comment, for ex-
ample, might suggest that the agency seriously considered the
substance of that comment, but it might also reflect nothing
more than the agency’s conscious effort to give the appearance
of an open mind, all the while having committed to the pro-
posed rule from the outset.
Further, by announcing some considerations it employs to
determine open-mindedness, the D.C. Circuit has made it pos-
sible for agencies to game the system by going through the
motions of open-mindedness without actually keeping an open
mind.  And because it is relatively clear what steps an agency
can take to be found to have kept an open mind, the presump-
tion of closed-mindedness established by the D.C. Circuit186 is
so easily rebutted that, in many circumstances, it might be
deemed totally ineffectual.  Agencies’ recent successes in satis-
fying the open mind standard certainly support that point.187
The open mind standard is also at least somewhat prob-
lematic to the extent it gives agencies an incentive to disregard
§ 553’s procedural requirements.  Particularly when an agency
knows exactly what steps it must take—more or less, what
boxes it must check—to demonstrate that it kept an open mind
about postpromulgation comments, it can confidently disre-
gard § 553’s prepromulgation notice and comment require-
ments with the knowledge that a court will uphold the agency’s
use of postpromulgation notice and comment.  In that case,
§ 553’s clear preference for prepromulgation notice and com-
ment is rendered largely advisory,188 a result that seems to be
at odds with the premium the D.C. Circuit itself has accorded
to prepromulgation notice and comment.189
Finally, even if the agency actually keeps an open mind,
the public might not believe that an agency has an open mind
with respect to postpromulgation comments.  The public’s sub-
jective belief about an agency’s open-mindedness is important
because, if the public does not believe the agency will seriously
186 Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., 900 F.2d at 379.
187 See, e.g., Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail v. Comm’r, 650 F.3d 691, 710
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding agency kept an open mind); Advocates for Highway &
Auto Safety, 28 F.3d at 1292 (finding the same).
188 See Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th Cir.
1992).
189 See N. J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1049–50 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
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consider postpromulgation comments, would-be commenters
will be dissuaded from submitting comments, thereby defeat-
ing the crowdsourcing function of the notice and comment re-
quirements.190  Thus, to the extent the public perceives a
difference between the chance to give prepromulgation com-
ments and the chance to give postpromulgation comments, the
open mind standard appears to wrongly disregard the signifi-
cance of that difference.
D. The Johnson Harmless Error Approach
In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit carved out a different middle
ground.191  There, the court looked at the record, including the
record from postpromulgation notice and comment, to ascer-
tain whether the Attorney General’s error—failing to give
prepromulgation notice and an opportunity to comment—was
harmless.192  Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
Attorney General’s lack of prepromulgation notice and com-
ment was harmless because, among other things: (1) the pre-
amble to the interim rule addressed all the arguments Johnson
raised on appeal; (2) the regulatory issue “involved a yes or no
decision,” rather than the sort of “nuanced and detailed” analy-
sis required for most other rules; (3) the Attorney General had
not changed his mind despite receiving postpromulgation com-
ments; and (4) Johnson had not availed himself of the opportu-
nity to participate in the postpromulgation comment
process.193
While the two approaches differ in obvious ways, the Fifth
Circuit’s approach in Johnson affords many of the same bene-
fits as the D.C. Circuit’s open mind standard.  Most notably,
each approach is grounded in § 706’s admonition that courts
not undo agency action because of harmless errors.194  Thus,
like the open mind standard, the Johnson approach is at least
superficially consistent with the text of the APA, while still af-
fording agencies some flexibility in promulgating and enforcing
interim-final and final rules.  The Johnson approach also re-
sembles the open mind standard in that it accords significance
to some postpromulgation notice and comment proceedings.
As a practical matter, by crediting postpromulgation notice and
190 See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Tailored Participation: Modernizing the APA
Rulemaking Procedures, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 335–36 (2009).
191 United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 2011).
192 Id. at 930–33.
193 Id. at 930–33.
194 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
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comment in some instances, the Johnson approach makes it
less likely that courts will invalidate the hundreds of
thousands of pages of rules not subjected to prepromulgation
notice and comment—with all the attendant destabilizing ef-
fects and waste of agency resources.195
The Johnson approach also avoids what might be viewed as
redundant procedures.  For example, Johnson did not say that
he would have submitted comments had he been given a
chance to do so before the rule was promulgated.  Indeed, there
is no reason to believe he would have done so, especially be-
cause, after the Attorney General promulgated the interim-final
rule, Johnson still did not submit comments, despite having
received notice of his right to do so.  There is a practical argu-
ment to be made that, in cases like Johnson’s, an agency
should not have to go through the time and expense of another
round of rulemaking in the name of a petitioner who had no
interest in participating in the rulemaking to begin with.196
A related practical benefit of the Johnson approach is that
it prevents seemingly undeserving parties from benefitting from
what in some instances might seem to be minor procedural
technicalities.  Not every agency rulemaking is controversial or
generates comments from interested parties.  Many agency
rulemakings make minor, narrowly tailored, or otherwise un-
controversial adjustments to existing rules.  When it is clear
that a party has violated a rule of which he knew or should
have known, and it is equally clear that the party’s violation of
the rule was in no way associated with any procedural viola-
tions underlying promulgation of the rule, there is something
inherently unjust about allowing that party to escape enforce-
ment of the rule by citing a procedural violation.197  The argu-
ment here resembles Cardozo’s criticism of the exclusionary
rule:  just as there is something intuitively wrong about the
195 See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text (discussing the conse- R
quences of widespread invalidation of postpromulgation procedures).
196 See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1113 n.5
(9th Cir. 2011) (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (noting party’s failure to submit comments
as support for finding of harmless error); City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228,
246 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting petitioners’ failure to suggest “any criticism they
would have raised concerning” EPA methodology at issue militated in favor of
finding procedural error harmless).
197 See United States v. Stevenson, 676 F.3d 557, 565 (6th Cir. 2012) (key to
harmless error analysis is simply “whether the affected parties had sufficient
opportunity to weigh in on the proposed rule,” rather than rigid adherence to
procedural requirements); Texas v. Lyng, 868 F.2d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 1989) (ask-
ing only whether the purposes of the notice and comment requirements were
satisfied, rather than focusing on procedural technicalities).
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criminal going free because the constable has blundered,198
here there is something unpalatable about letting a regulated
party engage in egregious behavior because an agency mistak-
enly relied on an admittedly murky exception from a procedu-
ral requirement.  An undue emphasis on such technicalities
can, as the Supreme Court has explained, encourage abuse of
the judicial process and thereby diminish public confidence in
the fair and effective operation of the judiciary.199  The Johnson
approach arguably protects against that possibility.
As with the other approaches discussed so far, however,
the Johnson approach has its share of drawbacks.  For one,
just like the open mind standard, liberal application of the
Johnson approach offers agencies a strong incentive to ignore
§ 553’s insistence on prepromulgation notice and comment.200
Even if § 706 renders the prepromulgation requirement more of
a preference than a mandate, the Johnson approach undenia-
bly undercuts that preference by making it easier for agencies
to ignore prepromulgation notice and comment whenever the
consequences of doing so might seem negligible.
Another problem with the Johnson approach is that, by
asking whether a petitioner participated in a postpromulgation
comment period or raised arguments different from those ad-
dressed by an interim-final rule or even a final rule, the ap-
proach inverts the burden of proof in harmless error
analysis.201  Ordinarily, that burden would rest on the
agency.202  However, to the extent the Johnson test requires a
petitioner to demonstrate not only that he or she would have
198 See People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (criticizing the exclusionary
rule because it allowed the criminal “to go free because the constable has
blundered”).
199 See Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407–08 (2009) (rejecting an overly
rigid approach to harmless error analysis).
200 See, e.g., Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 96
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[I]f the government could skip [§ 553] procedures, engage in
informal consultation, and then be protected from judicial review unless a peti-
tioner could show a new argument—not [already] presented informally—[§] 553
obviously would be eviscerated.”); U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 215 (5th
Cir. 1979) (“Were we to allow the EPA to prevail on this point we would make the
provisions of [§] 553 virtually unenforceable.  An agency that wished to dispense
with prepromulgation notice and comment could simply do so, invite postpromul-
gation comment, and republish the regulation before a reviewing court could
act.”).
201 See United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 522 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding
the Johnson court’s reasoning unpersuasive because its “reasoning misplaces the
burden of harmless-error analysis on the defendant”).
202 United States v. Brewer, 766 F.3d 884, 891 (8th Cir. 2014); Reynolds, 710
F.3d at 522; U.S. Steel Corp., 595 F.2d at 215 (“Absence of such prejudice must be
clear for harmless error to be applicable.”).
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commented but that his or her comments would have been
materially different from those comments the agency received,
the test places the burden squarely on the defendant.203  Thus,
even though the Johnson court purported to require a “clear”
showing of harmlessness from the government to uphold a pro-
cedurally invalid rule, in practice the burden still seems to fall
more heavily on the petitioner.
More problematic is that the Johnson harmless error anal-
ysis treats a petitioner’s arguments made during litigation as a
proxy for the arguments that would have been raised during a
notice and comment period.204  This is troubling for at least two
reasons.  First, when a court considers only arguments made
in litigation, it ignores important differences in context.  In par-
ticular, the public comment context lends itself to policy argu-
ments in a way that a legal challenge simply does not.  Because
the same person might reasonably raise different arguments in
public comments than as a litigant, it seems misguided to treat
as harmless an agency’s decision to forego prepromulgation
comment simply because the preamble to the contested rule
addressed whatever arguments an individual made in
litigation.205
Furthermore, by focusing harmless error review only upon
the arguments actually raised by litigants, the Johnson ap-
proach ignores the community aspect of notice-and-comment
rulemaking.  One of the virtues of an effective notice-and-com-
ment process is that it does not depend on any single com-
menter, or even class of commenters, to articulate all
objections to a proposed rule.  Rather, the process looks to the
public as a whole to raise concerns that might not have oc-
curred to other affected parties.206  Thus, the bare fact that the
petitioner in Johnson did not raise a particular objection during
postpromulgation notice and comment, or did not explain what
objections he would have raised during prepromulgation notice
and comment, is more or less a straw man.  Because the no-
tice-and-comment process allows individuals to benefit from
objections raised by others, the key question is not whether the
petitioner would have identified or raised an objection had the
agency undertaken prepromulgation notice and comment;
rather, the question is whether some party might have raised
203 See Brewer, 766 F.3d at 891; Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 522.
204 United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 931–32 (5th Cir. 2011).
205 Id.
206 Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 522–23 (“If a comment period had been provided,
others who could have asserted [petitioner’s] interest—such as public defenders
and public-interest groups—would almost certainly have weighed in.”).
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an objection had the agency afforded an opportunity for
prepromulgation comment.207  The Johnson approach improp-
erly places the entire burden on the petitioner to identify all
problems with the regulation.  It thus ignores an important
benefit of notice-and-comment rulemaking: the opportunity to
receive comments from the entire public.
Finally, it makes little sense to suggest, as the Johnson
court did, that failure to comply with prepromulgation notice
and comment is acceptable if the question being addressed by
the agency is a simple one.  Allowing the prepromulgation no-
tice and comment requirements to hinge on whether a given
regulation addresses a yes-or-no decision—as opposed to
something more complicated—introduces a discomfiting de-
gree of subjectivity into the APA’s already murky requirements
for notice and comment.  Depending on the level of abstraction
a court takes, nearly any decision can be broken down to some-
thing more complicated than a yes-or-no choice.  For example,
whereas the Fifth Circuit said the rule at issue in Johnson dealt
with a simple binary decision—whether to apply SORNA to pre-
Act sex offenders—the Supreme Court and several circuit
courts held that the decision addressed by the rule was actu-
ally susceptible to several other resolutions.208  The difference,
it seems, was simply that the Supreme Court and the other
circuits parsed more closely the policy options open to the At-
torney General at the time he promulgated the rule.209  Making
the requirement of prepromulgation notice and comment turn
on something so subjective arguably incentivizes judicial activ-
ism, because courts are often free to frame issues as narrowly
or broadly as they wish.210
207 See id.
208 See Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 981 (2012) (noting that
practical considerations “might have warranted different federal registration
treatment of different categories of pre-Act offenders”); Brewer, 766 F.3d at
891–92; Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 520–21.
209 Compare Johnson, 632 F.3d at 932 (characterizing the Attorney General’s
decision as “a yes or no decision—whether or not to apply SORNA’s registration
requirements to pre-enactment offenders”), with Brewer, 766 F.3d at 892 (“[T]he
Attorney General had a range of options: from applying SORNA to all pre-Act
offenders to applying SORNA to no pre-Act offenders.  The Attorney General also
had the opportunity to distinguish between ‘offenders who have fully left the
system and merged into the general population’ and those ‘who remain in the
system as prisoners, supervisees, or registrants, or reenter the system through
subsequent convictions.’” (quoting Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 521)).
210 See, e.g., J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, 1965–2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667, 698 (2008) (noting that “wide
discretion in framing” affords judges “freedom from textual constraint” and, as a
result, “the ability to issue contradictory decision after decision”).
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E. Remand Without Vacatur
Finally, thoroughness demands acknowledging that a few
circuits in the EPA nonattainment designation cases, after in-
validating the EPA’s actions for lack of notice and comment,
nevertheless sought a middle ground via the remedy imposed.
Specifically, the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in those
cases allowed the EPA’s regulations generally to remain in ef-
fect while the challenging parties, but not the public at large,
received the opportunity to submit comments before the EPA
refinalized the challenged designations.211  This approach ef-
fectively requires a second layer of postpromulgation comment,
but with participation limited to those parties that petitioned
the court for relief from the agency’s lack of prepromulgation
notice and comment.212  In short, the courts in these cases
declined to vacate a procedurally flawed rule, leaving it in place
and enforceable, even while remanding it to the agency for
additional procedures.213
In some respects, the remand without vacatur remedy
seems to offer an attractive approach to dealing with the
problems posed by postpromulgation procedures.  The D.C.
Circuit, which (the nonattainment designation cases notwith-
standing) is the principal court to employ remand without va-
catur, evaluates whether that remedy is appropriate by taking
into account two elements: the seriousness of the deficiencies
in the agency’s action and the disruptive consequences of va-
211 U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d 572, 576–77 (8th Cir. 1981); W. Oil & Gas
Ass’n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 812–13 (9th Cir. 1980).
212 U.S. Steel Corp., 649 F.2d at 577 (“On remand, the EPA should afford U.S.
Steel proper notice and opportunity to comment on the designations proposed by
the agency for the contested areas.  Thereafter, the EPA should expeditiously, but
fully, consider any comments received on the proposed designations and, upon
completing its deliberative process, immediately substitute any revised designa-
tions for the existing ones.”); W. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 633 F.2d at 813 (“We remand to
the Administrator with instructions that he provide these petitioners, who have
timely filed for review according to 42 U.S.C. [§] 7607, with an opportunity to
comment on the California designation.  The EPA is to consider and act on these
comments in accordance with 42 U.S.C. [§] 7407(d).” (citations omitted)).
213 U.S. Steel Corp., 649 F.2d at 577 (“We set aside the final rule only as to the
specific designations contested in this petition, but leave these designations in
effect pending completion of further administrative proceedings in accordance
with the APA.”); W. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 633 F.2d at 813 (leaving the challenged
designations in effect and remanding with instructions for the EPA to provide
petitioners with an opportunity to comment on the designations); Sharon Steel
Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that the challenged rule
should remain in effect except as applied to the petitioners and remanding to the
EPA with instructions to allow the petitioners to comment on the rule).
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cating that action.214  Having studied the issue extensively,
ACUS recently recommended a slightly different set of factors
for courts considering the remedy:
(a) [whether] correction is reasonably achievable in light of
the nature of the deficiencies in the agency’s rule or order;
(b) [whether] the consequences of vacatur would be disrup-
tive; and
(c) [whether] the interests of the parties who prevailed
against the agency in the litigation would be served by
allowing the agency action to remain in place.215
Given the multiplicity of circumstances in which agencies issue
interim-final rules with postpromulgation notice and comment,
and the potentially disruptive consequences of categorically de-
claring all regulations so promulgated to be invalid, a remand
without vacatur remedy based on some combination of these
elements seems potentially appropriate.
Also, remanding procedurally flawed rules without vacat-
ing them offers at least one unique benefit, in comparison to
the other approaches surveyed: it ensures that at least some of
the parties most interested in a rulemaking are allowed to sub-
mit comments in a way that will lead agencies to actually con-
sider the comments.  This is true for two reasons.  First, it is
true because the courts limited the additional round of com-
ment to a small group of interested parties—the litigants in the
cases on appeal.  The small pool of commenters makes it more
likely that agencies will take seriously the comments they re-
ceive, which means that the parties that care enough about the
designation to litigate it are at least more likely to have their
voices heard by the agency.  Second, because the agency must
consider the comments pursuant to a specific court order,
rather than a general statutory command to consider com-
ments, the remand without vacatur remedy makes it more
likely agencies will actually consider the comments rather than
brush them aside.
214 Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146,
150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also STEPHANIE J. TATHAM, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., THE UNUSUAL REMEDY OF REMAND WITHOUT VACUTUR 6 (2014), https://
www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Remand%20Without%20Vacatur
%20Final%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FUN-SRQM] (describing Allied-Sig-
nal in the context of the D.C. Circuit’s remand without vacatur jurisprudence).
215 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMIN. CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2013-
6, REMAND WITHOUT VACUTUR 5–6 (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/Remand%20Without%20Vacatur%20_%20Final%20Re
commendation.pdf [https://per0ma.cc/9ATJ-3D9A].
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In addition to focusing agencies’ attention on a handful of
the most determined commenters, remand without vacatur
also incorporates all of the benefits that adhere to postpromul-
gation notice and comment.  This is because remand without
vacatur does not do away with postpromulgation notice and
comment but rather adds another, more focused layer of post-
promulgation notice and comment to the public postpromulga-
tion comment period.  This makes it all the more likely that the
agency will carefully consider alternatives to a challenged des-
ignation before finalizing it once and for all.
Several reasons exist, however, for rejecting remand with-
out vacatur as a remedy in such cases.  First, the remedy is
highly controversial.  Judges have debated its legality, with
some claiming that allowing an otherwise invalid regulation to
remain in effect while the agency fixes its flaws on remand is
inconsistent with the text of APA § 706.216  Even if the remedy
is legal, some judges and scholars have questioned its wis-
dom.217  Perhaps as a result, courts have used it relatively
sparingly.  According to one study, the D.C. Circuit remanded
without vacating agency actions in seventy-three cases be-
tween 1972 and 2013.  The study found only ten cases during
that time period in which other circuits used the remedy—
three of which were the nonattainment designation cases in the
Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits highlighted in this article.218
Also, courts have generally limited the remedy’s use to cases in
which the agency actually pursued notice-and-comment
rulemaking and the resulting rules were arbitrary and capri-
cious for “inadequate explanation.”219  Notably, since the
nonattainment designation cases, no court has employed re-
216 Compare Sugar Cane Growers Coop. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 98 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (defending remand without vacatur), and Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d
452, 462–66 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Silberman, J., writing separately) (same), with Milk
Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 757 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Sentelle, J., dissent-
ing) (disputing the remedy’s legality), and Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 490 (Randolph,
J., writing separately) (same).
217 In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Griffith, J.,
concurring) (“[Q]uestion[ing] the wisdom of the open-ended remand without vaca-
tur” on the ground that “this remedy sometimes invites agency indifference”); Milk
Train, 310 F.3d at 757 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (contending that remand without
vacatur is “often, if not ordinarily, unwise” by “substituting [the court’s] decision
of an appropriate resolution for that of the agency to whom the proposition was
legislatively entrusted”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and Great Expecta-
tions: Remands Without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599,
601–02 (2004) (arguing that remand without vacatur has the paradoxical effect of
encouraging more interventionist judicial review).
218 TATHAM, supra note 214, at 21, 27. R
219 Kristina Daugirdas, Note, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur: A New Ju-
dicial Remedy for Defective Rulemakings, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 283 (2005).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-2\CRN201.txt unknown Seq: 45 11-JAN-16 13:03
2016] OPEN MINDS AND HARMLESS ERRORS 305
mand without vacatur as a remedy for an agency’s use of in-
terim-final rules with only postpromulgation notice and
comment.  It seems fair, therefore, to conclude that upon fur-
ther consideration, the courts have decided that remand with-
out vacatur is not appropriate under such circumstances.
Moreover, remand without vacatur presents certain practi-
cal challenges as well.  First, it is totally impractical on a large
scale.  To the extent an agency must grant every petitioner
something akin to a private audience, regulations and designa-
tions finalized with postpromulgation notice and comment will
never be truly final, since new petitioners will almost always be
waiting to come forward to challenge the designation.  Thus,
remand without vacatur does little to solve the administrative
problems caused by the hundreds of thousands of pages of
regulations that are currently in force but that were not subject
to prepromulgation notice and comment.  Indeed, one criticism
of remand without vacatur is that agencies tend to respond to
the remedy strategically, enforcing the rules in question as
though they had won the case, while assigning a low priority to
correcting the identified flaws that prompted the remand.220
According to one study, in a third of remanded cases examined,
agencies took more than five years to resolve the courts’ con-
cerns.221  One can only imagine that more widespread applica-
tion of remand without vacatur would, in effect, represent no
remedy at all.
In addition, there is something unfair about only acknowl-
edging that a rule is procedurally invalid, but enforcing it any-
way, especially where the effect of the ruling is to give just one
party an opportunity to cure the procedural defect.  If a rule is
invalid, giving it effect is problematic in itself.  It is even more
problematic when only one party will, as a result of the ruling,
be given an opportunity to rectify the deficiency (absent further
litigation).
III
FINDING A BETTER MIDDLE GROUND
The trend in the courts seems to be toward a middle
ground between the two extremes of either invalidating all reg-
ulations adopted using postpromulgation procedures without a
valid APA exemption or giving agencies carte blanche to substi-
tute postpromulgation notice and comment for prepromulga-
220 Id. at 301–04.
221 Id. at 302.
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tion procedures, even in the absence of a valid APA exemption.
Our view is that the search for a middle ground is appropriate.
Given the above analysis, we see the extremes of accepting or
opposing postpromulgation procedures in all cases as ill-ad-
vised, and we also doubt that the Supreme Court would be
inclined to go along with either.  Yet, for the reasons outlined
above, we also see the middle-ground approaches developed by
the courts thus far as missing the mark.  So what can we do to
build a “better” middle ground?  Which parts of these admit-
tedly flawed approaches should we borrow?
Rather than reinvent the wheel, we suggest altering the
existing jurisprudence in three ways: (1) to strengthen the pre-
sumption, implicit in many of the cases, that prepromulgation
notice and comment should be the norm, such that post-
promulgation procedures representing a deviation from that
norm would require a particularized defense subject to judicial
scrutiny; (2) to place the burden of rebutting that presumption
clearly on the agency that issued the regulations rather than
on the challenging party; and (3) to identify a more concrete list
of factors for courts to consider in deciding, case by case,
whether reliance on postpromulgation procedures in a
rulemaking represents harmless error.  Before we elaborate
this proposal, however, some theoretical perspective about why
we bother with prepromulgation notice and comment in the
first place, as well as the doctrine surrounding that practice, is
in order.
A. Stepping Back
Agency regulations that carry the force and effect of con-
gressionally enacted statutes are a key feature of the modern
administrative state.  Congress relies heavily on agencies to
operationalize and implement complex regulatory statutes;
agencies in turn adopt legally binding regulations to accom-
plish that task.  Given the complexity of the modern world,
Congress simply must rely on agencies in this way if it is to
achieve all that the American people expect from their govern-
ment.222  Still, while most Americans enjoy the benefits of mod-
ern government, at least a sizeable plurality retains some
residual discomfort with the prospect of unelected bureaucrats
222 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“[O]ur jurisprudence
has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex
society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives.”).
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adopting regulations governing primary behavior without the
relative public participation, transparency, and accountability
of the legislative process.223
Arguably, one reason that courts in particular have ignored
constitutional concerns and reconciled themselves to congres-
sional reliance on administrative agencies to develop legally
binding rules is that Congress has provided an acceptable al-
ternative to the legislative process in the form of the APA’s
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.224  Section 553’s
requirement of prepromulgation notice and comment, in par-
ticular, enhances good government and democratic legitimacy
in several respects.  For example, requiring an agency to con-
sider a broad range of viewpoints before adopting a rule makes
it more likely the agency will come up with the “best” possible
rule.225  “The agency benefits from the experience and input of
comments by the public, which help ‘ensure informed agency
decisionmaking.’”226
Requiring agencies to solicit and respond to public com-
ment before finalizing a proposed rule also makes it more
likely—at least in theory—that the agency will take seriously
the comments it receives.  Social science suggests that, once an
agency has begun administering a particular rule, the agency’s
interests in stability and continuity will make the agency reluc-
tant to change the rule.227  Under those circumstances, the
agency is less likely to view public comments as helpful sugges-
223 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (expressing concern about a “significant degree of independence” en-
joyed by administrative agencies); Cynthia R. Farina, Deconstructing Nondelega-
tion, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 96–99 (2010) (summarizing systemic concerns
about agency regulation); Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible
Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 357, 370 (2010) (describing Americans’ “complex and conflicted rela-
tionship with government”).
224 5 U.S.C. § 553; see, e.g., Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 170–71
(7th Cir. 1996) (exploring the democratic legitimacy rationale underlying the no-
tice and comment requirements).
225 See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir.
2011) (noting that one purpose of the APA’s notice and comment requirements is
“to ensure that agency regulations are tested via exposure to diverse public com-
ment” (quoting Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health
Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005))); United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d
408, 420 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Fairer and wiser rules result from the APA-required
‘mature consideration.’” (quoting Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
401 F.3d 666, 678 (6th Cir. 2005))).
226 N.C. Growers’ Ass’n v. United Farm Workers, 702 F.3d 755, 763 (4th Cir.
2012) (quoting Spartan Radiocasting Co. v. FCC, 619 F.2d 314, 321 (4th Cir.
1980)); see also Dismas, 401 F.3d at 678 (noting that one purpose of the notice
and comment requirements is “to get public input so as to get the wisest rules”).
227 Seidenfeld, supra note 156, at 522–23; Stern, supra note 158, at 614–15. R
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tions and more likely to treat them as obstacles to be overcome
in the name of maintaining the status quo.  Insisting on
prepromulgation notice and public comment avoids this prob-
lem by “ensur[ing] that affected parties have an opportunity to
participate in and influence agency decision making at an early
stage, when the agency is more likely to give real consideration
to alternative ideas.”228
Correspondingly, notice-and-comment rulemaking proce-
dures “reintroduce public participation and fairness to affected
parties after governmental authority has been delegated to un-
representative agencies.”229  “Although the Constitution em-
powers the President to keep federal officers accountable,
administrative agencies enjoy in practice a significant degree of
independence.”230  Some degree of agency independence is in-
evitable—even desirable—especially because elected represent-
atives typically lack the time and technical expertise required
to address the complex regulatory problems modern society
poses.231  But too much independence on the part of unelected
agency representatives threatens the ideal of democratic repre-
sentation.232  Providing for direct, meaningful public involve-
ment through prepromulgation notice and comment
procedures inserts an element of democracy into the rulemak-
ing process and thereby legitimates resulting rules.233
228 United States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1979)).
229 Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting
Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1511, 1559–60 (1992) (observing that notice-and-comment rulemaking pro-
cedures facilitate access and public interest-oriented discourse); Peter L. Strauss,
From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 745, 755 (1996) (noting that notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures allow all interested persons to participate on an equal footing).
230 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
231 ECONOMICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW xv (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2007) (list-
ing agency expertise and legislators’ lack of time as reasons legislatures delegate
policy-making authority to agencies); David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Admin-
istrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697,
701 (1994) (“One of the reasons that bureaucracies are created in the first place is
to implement policies in areas where Congress has neither the time nor expertise
to micromanage policy decisions.”).
232 See Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 728
(2001) (“The advent of the administrative state exponentially increases the diffi-
culties that political representation creates for the theory of self-government.”).
233 See Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 214 (D. Mass. 2003) (explain-
ing the “democratic legitimacy” rationale underlying the notice and comment
requirements).
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Section 553’s prepromulgation notice and comment re-
quirements also facilitate judicial review, which is important
because the APA relies on courts to check agency abuses in the
exercise of rulemaking power.234  Requiring agencies to con-
sider and address comments before issuing final rules gives
affected parties “an opportunity to develop evidence in the re-
cord to support their objections to the [final] rule.”235  A better-
developed record makes it easier for agencies to address and
resolve regulatory disputes themselves, making it less likely
that courts will be called on to resolve every such dispute.  A
better-developed record also “enhance[s] the quality of judicial
review” by giving courts more information on which to decide
administrative litigation.236  The APA’s prepromulgation notice
and comment procedures thus conserve judicial resources
while facilitating judicial oversight of agency action.
B. Moving Forward
Those, then, are the purposes of § 553’s prepromulgation
notice and comment requirements.237  Under § 706, a procedu-
ral error is harmful only if it undermines the purposes of a
procedural requirement.238  It follows that an agency’s failure
to undertake prepromulgation notice and comment is harmless
so long as some substitute procedure fulfills the purposes set
out above.239
It seems clear that postpromulgation notice and comment
can, in at least some cases, fulfill the purposes of § 553’s
prepromulgation notice and comment requirements.  Most fed-
234 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (2012) (providing for judicial review of agency ac-
tion); see Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153–54 (1967) (recognizing a
presumption in favor of pre-enforcement judicial review of agency rulemaking
efforts).
235 Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin.,
407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
236 Id.
237 See also United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 517 (3d Cir. 2013)
(summarizing “purposes of the APA’s notice and comment requirements” (quoting
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2011)); Nat’l Elec.
Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 99 F.3d 1170, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same).
238 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1174 (6th
Cir. 1983) (“[W]hen the purposes of the procedural requirements have been fully
met, there is no need for the courts to require rigid adherence to formalistic
rules.”); see also Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th Cir.
1992) (same).
239 See, e.g., United States v. Stevenson, 676 F.3d 557, 565 (6th Cir. 2012)
(explaining that determining whether an agency’s failure to undertake prepromul-
gation notice and comment is harmless is dependent on “whether the same rule
would have issued absent the error” and “whether the affected parties had suffi-
cient opportunity to weigh in on the proposed rule”).
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eral appellate courts have suggested as much.240  As a practi-
cal matter, there is nothing inherent in postpromulgation
notice and comment that precludes such procedures from ful-
filling the purposes of prepromulgation notice and comment.
There may, of course, be instances where postpromulgation
notice and comment are an inadequate substitute for
prepromulgation notice and comment.241 But that will not al-
ways be so.242  The question, then, is not whether postpromul-
gation notice and comment can render harmless an agency’s
failure to engage in prepromulgation notice and comment, but
under what circumstances postpromulgation notice and com-
ment actually do so.  In other words: How can courts tell when
postpromulgation notice and comment have resulted in the
same kind of meaningful opportunity to participate in the
rulemaking process as prepromulgation notice and comment
would have provided?  At the risk of resorting to what some
might label “th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test,”243 we
suggest the following doctrinal adjustments.
1. A Stronger Presumption of Invalidity
First, courts should expressly adopt a strong—if rebutta-
ble—presumption that rules promulgated using postpromulga-
tion notice and comment are invalid.  Thus far, for the most
part, courts generally have alluded only to a vague “presump-
tion against a ‘late’ comment period following adoption of an
interim rule,”244 and have required little evidence to overcome
that presumption.245  The lack of discernible teeth in the pre-
240 See, e.g., id.; Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 647 F.3d 929, 940 (10th Cir.
2011) (holding that although the regulation at issue was issued in response to
litigation and did not undergo notice and comment, “[n]either factor alters our
conclusion”); Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1380–81
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (dismissing a challenge on an agency’s rule based on a lack of
notice and comment); United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 2011)
(same); Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d
1288, 1291–93 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same); Riverbend Farms, 958 F.2d at 1487;
Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 188 (1st Cir. 1983) (same).
241 See, e.g., Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding no
harmless error because agency’s mistake “clearly had a bearing on the procedure
used”).
242 See Texas v. Lyng, 868 F.2d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining that not
every error affecting procedure is harmful).
243 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).  Justice Scalia used this phrase to describe the Skidmore standard of judicial
review and did not intend the description to be complimentary.
244 Petry v. Block, 737 F.2d 1193, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
245 See, e.g., Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety, 28 F.3d at 1292–93 (find-
ing the presumption against “open-mindedness” overcome where agency merely
responded to the four comments it received opposing the interim-final rule).
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sumption against postpromulgation notice and comment is
problematic, both statutorily and practically.
First, as a statutory matter, unless the agency can validly
claim one of the statutory exceptions from notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking requirements, the APA expressly contem-
plates that agencies will provide notice and opportunity for
comment before, rather than after, adopting regulations that
carry legal force.246  For all of the reasons discussed above,247
§ 553(c) calls for giving interested persons an opportunity for
comment “[a]fter notice” and for agencies to publish explana-
tory preambles along with adopted regulations “[a]fter consid-
eration of the relevant matter presented” through that
comment process.248  Section 706 in turn instructs courts to
take “due account . . . of the rule of prejudicial error” but does
not specify which errors courts ought to consider harmless.249
The Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Proce-
dure Act offers only that “not every failure to observe the re-
quirements of this statute . . . is ipso facto fatal to the validity
of” agency action—suggesting at least that harmless error anal-
ysis ought to be case-by-case rather than categorical.250  In the
absence of a valid exemption claim, a strong presumption
against the validity of postpromulgation notice and comment
best respects the balance between an express statutory com-
mand for prepromulgation notice and comment and a particu-
larized harmless error rule.
As a practical matter, if agencies see no disadvantage to
relying on postpromulgation notice and comment, they will
more frequently disregard § 553’s prepromulgation require-
ments and rely on § 706’s harmless error doctrine to sustain
rules against procedural objections.  A robust, well-defined
presumption of invalidity—rather than the weak, indetermi-
nate one that courts have applied thus far—will help diminish
the attractiveness of postpromulgation notice and comment by
making it less likely courts will sanction such an end run
around the prepromulgation notice and comment require-
ments.  A strong presumption against the validity of post-
promulgation notice and comment is all the more significant
246 Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,111–12 (Aug. 18,
1995) (“Under current law, agencies must be able to justify use of the good cause
or other exemptions from notice and comment procedures under the APA if they
are providing only post-promulgation comment opportunity.”).
247 See supra subpart III.A.
248 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
249 Id. § 706.
250 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 138. R
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given the presumption of validity that applies when agencies
use prepromulgation notice and comment.251
2. The Agency Should Bear the Burden of Rebuttal
Consistent with the APA’s harmless error rule, however,
the presumption against postpromulgation notice and com-
ment should be rebuttable on a case-by-case basis.  As the
existing jurisprudence recognizes implicitly, a harmless error
determination is probably appropriate in some instances.252
Rather than the challenging party bearing a burden of demon-
strating that the alleged procedural defect was harmful, how-
ever, in the context of postpromulgation notice and comment,
the burden should fall on the agency to rebut the presumption
of invalidity.
In many litigation scenarios, the party challenging a stat-
ute or ruling bears the burden of showing that an alleged defect
in the statute or ruling was harmful.  But placing the burden of
proof on the challenging party is not a blanket rule.  As the
Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]here are no hard-and-fast
standards governing the allocation of the burden of proof in
every situation.  The issue, rather, ‘is merely a question of pol-
icy and fairness based on experience in the different situa-
tions.’ ”253  When an agency adopts a rule without
prepromulgation notice and comment, there are a number of
considerations involving policy and fairness that militate in
favor of requiring the agency to demonstrate the harmlessness
of its error, rather than expecting a challenging party to prove
that the agency’s procedural failure was harmful.
First, fairness militates in favor of placing the burden of
proof on the agency because the consequences of forgoing
prepromulgation notice and comment are often potentially se-
vere.  Relying solely on postpromulgation notice and comment
in adopting a rule threatens to entirely freeze the public out of
meaningful participation in the rulemaking process.254  Where
251 See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League v. FCC, 617 F.2d 875, 879 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (noting that review of rulemaking conducted pursuant to § 553 “is generally
quite limited” and that the court “presumes agency action to be valid”).
252 As Parts I and II of this Article reflect, the mere fact that courts have
generally sought a middle-path approach to evaluating postpromulgation notice
and comment suggests their intuition that invalidating every procedurally flawed
rule is overkill, and that sometimes postpromulgation notice and comment are
good enough.
253 Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1., Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973) (quoting
9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940)).
254 See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 518 (3d Cir. 2013)
(explaining that the purposes of notice and comment “often cannot be fulfilled
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an agency validly asserts an exception from APA notice-and-
comment rulemaking requirements, the opportunity for com-
ment postpromulgation is almost certainly preferable to the
alternative, which is no chance for public participation at
all.255  But, as several courts have recognized, in the absence of
a valid exception, relying on postpromulgation procedures
alone represents a complete failure on the part of the agency
that disadvantages interested parties in a way that other, more
technical procedural failures do not.256  Relying solely on post-
promulgation procedures significantly increases the likelihood
that helpful or valuable comments will be ignored, and thus
that the rule in question will be different from what it would
have been had procedures been followed.257  Moreover, be-
cause an agency has total control over whether it undertakes
prepromulgation notice and comment, the agency alone is in a
position to avoid the consequences of failing to comply with the
APA.  The potential consequences of ignoring notice and com-
ment, combined with the agency’s ability to prevent such a
defect in the first place, makes it fair to put the burden of
proving harmlessness on the agency.
Second, as a matter of policy, placing the burden of proof
on the challenging party risks undermining the APA’s procedu-
ral requirements for rulemakings.  An agency is never required
to adopt a particular version of a rule or act on particular
comments.258  Indeed, no matter how much evidence a party
marshals in support of a given rule, the agency is free to adopt
the opposite rule, so long as it articulates some rational basis
for doing so.259  Thus, except in the most unusual of cases—for
example, if an agency were to concede expressly that it would
have adopted a different rule had a party’s comments been
before it—a claimant will never be able to carry the burden of
because there has been no effort to have the kind of exchange of views and
information the requirements are intended to generate” with postpromulgation
notice and comment).
255 See Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,112 (Aug. 18,
1995) (“[I]t is still advantageous to provide such procedures, even if offered after
the rule has been promulgated.  Public comment can provide both useful informa-
tion to the agency and enhanced public acceptance of the rule.”)
256 See, e.g., McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1323–24
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (refusing to adopt a rule that the party challenging the agency
rule must show “specific prejudice” as “normally inappropriate where the agency
has completely failed to comply with § 533”).
257 See supra notes 173–77 and accompanying text. R
258 Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th Cir. 1992).
259 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (requiring an agency defending a rule to demon-
strate merely the rationality of its choices).
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proving that an agency’s failure to comply with § 553 affected
the result of a rulemaking.  Faced with such a claim, an agency
wishing to establish harmlessness need only reply that it would
have adopted the same rule irrespective of the procedures fol-
lowed.260  Giving agencies such an easy “out” from prepromul-
gation notice and comment would dramatically reduce any
incentive for agencies to comply with § 553, and the require-
ments in that section would become afterthoughts.261  To avoid
that result—which is plainly contrary to Congress’s statutorily
expressed preference for prepromulgation notice and com-
ment—the  agency, rather than the party challenging the rule,
must be required to demonstrate the harmlessness of its fail-
ure to comply with § 553.
But what of Shinseki v. Sanders, in which the Supreme
Court held that, under the APA, the challenger rather than the
agency bears the burden of proving that the agency’s procedu-
ral errors are harmful?262 Shinseki concerned an agency adju-
dication of a benefits claim, rather than a rulemaking, and
important differences between the two justify assigning the
burden of proof differently as well.  A party subject to an agency
adjudication can demonstrate the presence or absence of rele-
vant facts and thereby establish its entitlement, under the law,
to a favorable outcome.  Because it is thus within said party’s
power to show that the agency’s mistake led to a ruling that
was erroneous as a matter of law, it is not categorically unfair
in the context of agency adjudications to follow the traditional
rule “that the party that ‘seeks to have a judgment set aside
because of an erroneous ruling carries the burden of showing
that prejudice resulted.’”263  By contrast, because “[a]n agency
is not required to adopt a rule that conforms in any way to the
comments presented to it,”264 a party challenging a rule will
never be able to establish that the outcome of a rulemaking—
i.e., the substance of the resulting rule—would have changed
had the agency given the party proper notice and the opportu-
nity to submit comments before the agency promulgated the
rule.  Placing the burden of proof on a party challenging a rule
thus asks the challenging party to do the impossible.  Given
that fundamental distinction between adjudications and
rulemakings, treating the two similarly for purposes of allocat-
260 Riverbend Farms, 958 F.2d at 1487.
261 See United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 517 (3d Cir. 2013).
262 556 U.S. 396, 408–09 (2009).
263 Id. at 409 (quoting Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116 (1943)).
264 Riverbend Farms, 958 F.2d at 1487.
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ing burdens of proof contravenes common sense.  The few cir-
cuits to have even touched on this issue appear to agree,265 or
have at least left open the possibility of distinguishing Shinseki
on this ground.266
3. Factors for Rebutting the Presumption
Although courts should require agencies to demonstrate
the harmlessness of their reliance on postpromulgation proce-
dures, courts should not make rebutting the presumption of
invalidity too onerous.  Courts should consider several factors
in deciding whether postpromulgation notice and comment ful-
fill the key purposes of prepromulgation notice and comment.
a. Agency Responsiveness
The D.C. Circuit has already identified two relevant factors:
an agency’s responsiveness to postpromulgation comments
and actual changes made to the interim-final rule.267  Both are
indicators of an agency’s willingness to take seriously the com-
ments it receives even after promulgating an interim-final rule.
Courts should be mindful of both those factors when determin-
ing whether postpromulgation notice and comment were
harmful.
An agency’s thorough explanation of its reason for rejecting
a particular comment, for example, is evidence that the agency
at least reviewed the comment—albeit not necessarily with an
open mind.268  Whether or not the agency approached com-
ments received with an open mind, the agency’s responses to
those comments at least facilitate judicial review of the
agency’s rulemaking for reasoned decision making under APA
§ 706(2)(A) and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United
States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.269  Like-
265 See Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 518–19; Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Energy, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011). But see Cal. Wilderness Coal, 631 F.3d at
1109–10 (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (interpreting Shinseki to require that, when a party
challenges a rule on procedural grounds, that party bears the burden of showing
that the procedural defect was harmful).
266 In United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 2011), the Fifth Circuit
both cited Shinseki and placed at least some burden on the challenging party to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the agency’s procedural failures. See id.
at 930–33 & nn.107 & 120.  But the Johnson court did not precisely link the two,
and its statements regarding the burden of proof are too mushy to represent a
clear and unequivocal conclusion regarding the proper application of Shinseki in
the rulemaking context.
267 Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d
1288, 1292–93 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
268 Id. at 1292.
269 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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wise, an agency’s decision to actually change parts of a final
rule in response to comments means that the agency was re-
sponsive to at least some of the comments it received, even if it
may not have been willing to seriously consider all of them.270
An agency’s responsiveness to comments received through
postpromulgation procedures offers at most an incomplete pic-
ture of whether an agency has given meaningful consideration
to postpromulgation comments it received.  An agency decision
not to make any change to a rule in the face of postpromulga-
tion comments may, for example, be less a reflection of the
seriousness of the agency’s consideration than a commentary
on the lack of merit in the comments themselves.  Discerning
an agency’s mindset regarding notice and comment—reading
the administrative tea leaves—based solely on the agency’s offi-
cial response to proposed comments ignores other factors that
may offer greater insight into an agency’s good faith in under-
taking postpromulgation notice and comment.
b. Evidence of Agency Motives
For this reason, courts should look behind the form of an
agency’s responsiveness to ascertain and evaluate an agency’s
motives for foregoing prepromulgation notice and comment.
Circumstances suggesting an agency’s bad faith in foregoing
prepromulgation notice and comment should effectively dis-
credit its postpromulgation procedures.
For instance, if it is clear a rule was promulgated specifi-
cally to achieve a particular result in litigation—e.g., so that a
court would give Chevron deference to an agency’s preferred
interpretation of a statute—it is reasonable to assume the issu-
ing agency will be disinclined to seriously consider comments
that, if incorporated into the rule, could defeat the result
sought.271  Courts generally have allowed agencies to obtain
Chevron review for such “fighting regulations”272 on the theory
that notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures ensure rea-
soned decision making and adequately protect against agency
270 See Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety, 28 F.3d at 1292–93.
271 This was certainly the experience with the tax basis overstatement regula-
tions discussed in subpart I.C of this Article. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor
Kristin E. Hickman in Support of Respondents at 31–32, United States v. Home
Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11–139) (documenting the
reaction to postpromulgation procedures in that instance).
272 See generally Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over “Fighting Regs” and Judi-
cial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 643, 648 (2012) (using the term
“fighting regulations” to describe agency rules adopted during litigation).
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arbitrariness, pending litigation notwithstanding.273  But an
agency’s reliance on interim-final rules and postpromulgation
procedures under such circumstances suggests the opposite:
that the agency is behaving strategically.274  The same analysis
would apply whenever circumstances suggest obvious incen-
tives—beyond the standard costs of modifying a rule—for an
agency to avoid deviating from a position staked out in an
interim-final rule.  When an agency has a vested institutional
interest in a particular version of a rule, courts should be less
inclined to believe the agency seriously considered postpromul-
gation comments.275
Outside the litigation context, the administrative record
may offer other indications of an agency’s motives for foregoing
prepromulgation notice and comment.  Where an agency’s ac-
tions suggest a genuine, good-faith belief and effort to demon-
strate that good cause exists for skipping prepromulgation
notice and comment, followed by prompt pursuit of post-
promulgation procedures as ACUS and others suggest reflect
best practices, then it is more reasonable to presume the
agency took seriously postpromulgation comments received,
and courts should be more willing to countenance postpromul-
gation notice and comment as a substitute for prepromulgation
notice and comment.276  By contrast, when it appears that an
agency haphazardly or pretextually claimed any of the statu-
tory exemptions from notice-and-comment rulemaking re-
quirements in an effort to either avoid bureaucratic hassle or
expedite the agency’s policy preferences, a court could justifia-
bly infer that the agency was unlikely to have taken post-
promulgation public input seriously.  Correspondingly, courts
should also consider the time the agency spent considering
comments before promulgating the rule in final form.277  For
273 See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996)
(“That it was litigation which disclosed the need for the regulation is irrelevant.”).
274 Lederman, supra note 272, at 671–74 (describing strategic scenarios for R
adopting regulations in the midst of litigation).
275 Cf. Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 222 (4th Cir. 1975) (“The reception of
comments after all the crucial decisions have been made is not the same as
permitting active and well prepared criticism to become a part of the decision-
making process.”).
276 Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Devine, 671 F.2d 607, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(upholding agency’s invocation of good cause exception where agency promul-
gated regulations under exceptional circumstances and agreed to expeditiously
undertake postpromulgation notice and comment); see also Mid-Tex Elec. Coop,
Inc. v. FERC, 822 F.2d 1123, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same).
277 See Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d
1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (recognizing argument that “the four-day interval
between the close of the public comment period . . . and the issuance of the [final
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example, if an agency finalizes a rule a mere day or two after
the close of a comment period, despite having received
thousands of comments, a court could reasonably conclude the
agency did not pay those comments much heed.
Notably, the reverse is not true.  If an agency delays in
finalizing an interim rule after receiving public comments con-
cerning the rule, the delay might just as easily be the product of
agency inattentiveness as the product of agency deliberation
about the comments.  For that reason, although courts should
treat an unusually speedy turnaround as evidence that an
agency ignored public comments, they should not treat delay
as evidence that the agency seriously considered the comments
it received.
c. Concerns for Democratic Legitimacy
Courts should be more inclined to credit postpromulgation
notice and comment where agencies make significant efforts to
publicize the opportunity to postpromulgation public com-
ment, for instance, by hosting public meetings on the interim-
final rule or conducting significant online campaigns encourag-
ing postpromulgation comments.278  When an agency does
more than is necessary or goes out of its way to encourage
public comment, it suggests the agency is taking the post-
promulgation notice-and-comment process at least as seri-
ously as it would have taken a prepromulgation notice-and-
comment process.279
The considerations we have suggested thus far address
whether an agency took seriously the postpromulgation notice-
and-comment process, so that the public receives a “full and
fair opportunity to be heard” and the agency correspondingly
derives actual benefit from public comment.280  In addition to
rule]” was evidence that the agency “gave the comments only cursory
examination”).
278 See, e.g., Sherwin v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 685 F.2d 1, 5–6 (1st
Cir. 1982) (noting with approval that “SSA adopted the Grid only after a substan-
tial effort to ‘obtain as much public input over as broad a spectrum as possible,’”
including by holding public meetings in three major cities (quoting Rules for
Adjudicating Disability Claims in Which Vocational Factors Must Be Considered,
43 Fed. Reg. 55,349, 55,356–57 (Nov. 27, 1978))).
279 See Latin Ams. for Soc. & Econ Dev. v. Adm’r of Fed. Highway Admin., 756
F.3d 447, 461, 468 (6th Cir. 2014) (detailing extensive public outreach efforts by
agency and relying on that outreach to support the conclusion that the agency’s
decision was the result of “a lengthy, reasoned process based on an objective
analysis subject to public scrutiny throughout”).
280 See Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760, 769 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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ensuring serious consideration of comments received, however,
courts reviewing postpromulgation notice and comment for
harmlessness should also consider the extent to which an
agency’s use of postpromulgation notice and comment gives
rise to concerns about democratic legitimacy.  The fact is that
some rulemakings are simply more consequential than others,
maybe because of their subject matter, or perhaps because of
their scope.  In some cases involving interim-final rules and
postpromulgation procedures, the regulations are hugely con-
troversial, making public participation in the rulemaking pro-
cess especially important as a means of achieving public
acceptance of the ultimate outcome.  But some rulemakings
are small, pursue narrow amendments to existing regulations,
or otherwise lack controversy.  No matter when they occur,
notice and comment procedures will yield little public input.281
To resolve these concerns, courts should consider things
like the extent to which the public is actually made aware of an
opportunity for postpromulgation comment.  Widespread
awareness of such an opportunity will generally make it sub-
stantially more likely the public will see the resulting rule as
the result of a democratic process and therefore democratically
legitimate.  Courts can gauge public awareness of a post-
promulgation comment period in a number of ways.  One con-
sideration is whether the measures an agency has employed to
notify the public of an opportunity for postpromulgation com-
ment are likely to work.  To this end, a widespread multimedia
campaign undertaken in connection with a postpromulgation
comment period is more likely to lend the resulting rule an air
of democratic legitimacy than is a simple publication in the
Federal Register.
Another way for courts to test the democratic legitimacy of
postpromulgation notice and comment would be to compare
the nature and volume of the public’s response to postpromul-
gation notice and comment with what might have been ex-
pected from prepromulgation notice and comment.  There are
several ways a court might undertake such a comparison.  For
example, if a particularly obvious or important argument was
not raised and addressed at some point in the postpromulga-
tion notice-and-comment process, a court might be more in-
281 For example, one rulemaking study identified thirty-one Treasury Depart-
ment rulemakings in a three-year period that generated no public comments—
seventeen of which involved the use of temporary regulations with postpromulga-
tion procedures, but fourteen of which used prepromulgation notice and com-
ment. See Hickman, supra note 26, at 1758–59. R
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clined to conclude that postpromulgation notice and comment
failed in their essential purpose.  By contrast, if the most obvi-
ous and important arguments were raised and addressed dur-
ing postpromulgation notice and comment, a court should be
more willing to believe the rule elicited the sort of public input
that would render it more democratically legitimate.  Along the
same lines, if a court would ordinarily expect a particular rule
to elicit thousands of public comments, but postpromulgation
notice and comment only yielded a dozen comments, the court
could reasonably assume not only that the timing of the notice
and opportunity to comment are to blame for the difference but
that the dearth of public input is likely to undermine the re-
sulting rule’s democratic legitimacy.
Projecting the public response to prepromulgation notice
and comment is far from an exact science.  But that is not to
say it is impossible, or that courts lack the expertise or famili-
arity with the administrative process necessary to discern
when public participation has been adversely affected by the
lack of prepromulgation notice and comment.  A court can
make some estimate of how the public would have responded
to a prepromulgation opportunity to comment by examining
the public’s response to similar proposed rules in the past.  The
court could also consider whether certain key stakeholders—
parties that would be expected to weigh in under normal cir-
cumstances—actually utilized the postpromulgation comment
period.  If such comparisons suggest that the postpromulgation
notice and comment procedures did not adequately replicate
similar instances involving prepromulgation notice and com-
ment, a court should be less likely to find the lack of
prepromulgation notice and comment to have been harmless
error.
4. Potential Criticism
One virtue of our approach is that it builds on the current
jurisprudential trend toward a middle-ground compromise,
even as we advocate a stricter approach to judicial review than
provided in most past cases.  Nevertheless, the approach we
have outlined is not immune from certain criticisms.
Some may argue that crediting postpromulgation notice
and comment as an occasional substitute for prepromulgation
notice and comment will in effect undermine § 553’s command
that agencies undertake prepromulgation notice and comment.
In one sense, that criticism is valid, since permitting any kind
of substitute for prepromulgation notice and comment makes it
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-2\CRN201.txt unknown Seq: 61 11-JAN-16 13:03
2016] OPEN MINDS AND HARMLESS ERRORS 321
inherently less likely that agencies will use prepromulgation
notice and comment.282  But the criticism misses the mark.
The harmless error rule codified in § 706 itself recognizes that a
procedural deviation is not necessarily enough to invalidate a
rule.283  The proper concern, courts have explained, is not with
enforcing procedural requirements for procedural require-
ments’ sake.284  Instead, consistent with the harmless error
rule, courts reviewing agency action should look to whether the
purposes of the procedural requirement were addressed.285
Thus, whether postpromulgation notice and comment detract
from the appeal of prepromulgation notice and comment is
somewhat beside the point.  The real question is whether they
do so in a way that deviates from the purpose of § 553’s
prepromulgation requirement.  The answer, as we have tried to
show, is that postpromulgation notice and comment are not
inherently deficient and that courts can at least make a deter-
mination as to its efficacy on a case-by-case basis.
Our approach also guards against the temptation to forego
prepromulgation notice and comment.  Under our approach,
when an agency goes the postpromulgation notice and com-
ment route, it must overcome a meaningful presumption
against validity and must do so using concrete, objective crite-
ria.  That hurdle is not one that agencies have to overcome
when they use prepromulgation notice and comment.  Quite
the contrary, rules adopted using prepromulgation notice and
comment are presumptively valid.286  Thus, our method im-
poses an incentive on agencies to follow § 553, just without
locking them in a procedural straightjacket.
Furthermore, from a practical perspective, some deviation
from the prepromulgation requirement is necessary because,
as discussed above, strict compliance with prepromulgation
notice and comment would require agencies to repromulgate,
at great cost, a glut of regulations that have been in force for
years.287  If the alternative is invalidating hundreds of
thousands of pages of rules at tremendous costs—both mone-
tary and in terms of governmental efficiency—then fundamen-
282 Riverbend Farms, 958 F.2d at 1487.
283 Id. at 1488 (“While some may argue that would be all for the good, we
cannot and will not presume that Congress intended the APA’s harmless error
rule to be a nullity.”).
284 See Texas v. Lyng, 868 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1989).
285 Id.; United States v. Stevenson, 676 F.3d 557, 565 (6th Cir. 2012); Sage-
brush Rebellion, 790 F.2d at 764–65.
286 Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 617 F.2d 875, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
287 See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. R
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tal policy concerns arguably dictate that harmless error
analysis be construed to afford agencies more latitude within
which to operate.  Those who insist on absolute adherence to
the prepromulgation requirement ignore this practical reality.
A final criticism of our approach might be that even if
courts consider all the factors we recommend, they might still
end up sanctioning rules where agencies did not really give
meaningful consideration to postpromulgation comments.  But
that argument sets the bar too high.  Indeed, scholars have
derided prepromulgation notice and comment as an expensive
and time-consuming form of Kabuki theatre in which agencies
merely feign open-mindedness without actually considering
the comments they receive.288  These notice-and-comment
skeptics like to point out, for example, that agencies rarely
make major changes to rules as a result of the comments they
receive, meaning that most final rules are materially indistin-
guishable from the versions agencies propose without the ben-
efit of public comment.289  According to these commentators,
the APA’s prepromulgation notice and comment requirements
are simply a waste of the government’s and the public’s time
and resources.  To the extent our approach to postpromulga-
tion notice and comment might be said to allow agencies to
pass judicial review just by “going through the motions,” that
criticism applies at least as much to prepromulgation notice
and comment.  Indeed, by requiring agencies to provide objec-
tive indicia of their receptiveness to postpromulgation public
comments, our method arguably guarantees more meaningful
public participation than the prepromulgation requirement.
CONCLUSION
Sometimes agency procedural failures are harmful, but not
always.  A bright-line rule that either approves as harmless or
rejects as harmful an agency’s use of postpromulgation notice
and comment in all instances fails to accommodate this reality.
Harmlessness, however, is more concept than constant.  Pre-
288 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490,
1492 (1992) (calling notice-and-comment rulemaking “a highly stylized process
for displaying . . . something which in real life takes place in other venues”).
289 See Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process:
Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245,
259 (1998); Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the
Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1447 (2013); William F. West,
Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bu-
reaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66,
74 (2004).
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scribing a precise formula that reliably and consistently identi-
fies those occasions where postpromulgation notice and
comment renders harmless the failure to undertake
prepromulgation notice and comment is not a simple task be-
cause the harmlessness inquiry frequently turns on the inter-
play of multiple context-specific considerations.
But the mere fact that developing a coherent standard by
which to adjudicate such cases is difficult does not mean that
courts and commentators should abstain from the effort alto-
gether.  On the contrary, as agencies increasingly rely on post-
promulgation notice and comment as a substitute for the
rulemaking procedures imposed by APA § 553, it becomes all
the more essential that courts develop meaningful standards
by which to ascertain harmlessness.  Ideally, the criteria on
which the courts settle will be uniform.  To achieve that uni-
formity, congressional or Supreme Court guidance may ulti-
mately be necessary.
To advance that process, this Article both highlights the
problem and, rationalizing the existing jurisprudence, suggests
a few key elements for evaluating when postpromulgation no-
tice and comment adequately substitute their prepromulgation
counterparts.  We harbor no illusions that our approach is per-
fect, but it is defensible.  Refining our proposal or figuring out
some alternative approach going forward is imperative, be-
cause the problems attendant to postpromulgation notice and
comment are not going away.
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